Hofstra Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1

Article 9

1987

Gonna Fly Now: All the Noise about the Airport
Access Problem
James F. Gesualdi

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gesualdi, James F. (1987) "Gonna Fly Now: All the Noise about the Airport Access Problem," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 16: Iss. 1,
Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss1/9

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Gesualdi: Gonna Fly Now: All the Noise about the Airport Access Problem

GONNA FLY NOW: ALL THE NOISE ABOUT THE
AIRPORT ACCESS PROBLEM
CONTENTS

I.
II.

214

PROLOGUE .....................................
INTRODUCTION .................................

215

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AIRPORT ACCESS

219

PROBLEM ......................................

III.

FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT WITH AIRPORT ACCESS AND

NOISE ISSUES ...................................
A. Airport Access Related Legislation ...........
B. Noise Control Legislation and Regulation .....
IV. AIRPORT ACCESS AND NOISE REGULATION CASES ....
A. Nonproprietor Cases ........................
B. ProprietorCases ...........................
1. Valid Proprietor Regulations ..............
2. Invalid Proprietor Regulations ............
C. Summary of the Case Law ..................
V.

LOCAL

REGULATION: THE CASE

OF LONG

ISLAND

MACARTHUR AIRPORT ..........................

VI.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

VIII.

257

PROPOSALS REGARDING THE AIRPORT ACCESS PROB-

LEM:

VII.

228
228
233
243
243
248
248
255
256

1982-87 ...................................
Industry Task Force on Airport Capacity Improvement and Delay Reduction ..............
Airport Access Task Force ..................
Airline Industry Proposal ...................
FAA Proposal .............................
Working Group on Aircraft Noise/Airport Capacity ....................................

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE AIRPORT
ACCESS PROBLEM ...............................
CONCLUSION ...................................

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1987

270
270
271
274
275
277
281
284

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:213

The quietest jet in the world is infinitely louder than no jet at all.'
James T. Murphy
Vice President, Airspace & Airports
Air Transport Association
Noise is the sound of commerce. If you want commerce you will
2
have to put up with some noise.
Donald D. Engen
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
PROLOGUE

On January 31, 1988, the Washington Redskins defeated the
Denver Broncos in that annual American spectacle, the Super Bowl.'
The team from the nation's capital won, in large part, because of the
successful aerial attack launched by MVP Quarterback Doug Williams.4 Later that night, residents around San Diego's Lindbergh
Field, like the Denver secondary, were subject to an aerial bombardment, but one of a different kind.5 This assault consisted of the noise

from thirty to thirty-five aircraft departures an hour due to the temporary suspension of a night curfew at the airport.' Interestingly,
other similar noise and access regulations7 at airports throughout the
1. Interview with James T. Murphy, Vice President, Airspace & Airports, Air Transport
Association, in Washington, D.C. (June 16, 1987) [hereinafter J. Murphy interview].
2. Ott, FAA Noise Policy to Stress National System, Fleet Replacement, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1986, at 28 (quoting then FAA Administrator Engen). But see
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, POLLUTION AND YOUR
HEALTH (May 1976), reprinted in SOCIAL IssuEs RESOURCES SERIES, 2 POLLUTION ARTICLE

23, at 12 (1979) ("Noise is perhaps the most overlooked and underestimated form of environmental pollution. This is partly true because noise has long been regarded as an inevitable
accompaniment to modern life.") These two quotes succinctly point to the dramatic differences
between the FAA and EPA approaches to the problem of aircraft generated noise, discussed
infra notes 131-38, 141-48 and accompanying text.
3. Super Bowl XXII (ABC television broadcast Jan. 31, 1988).
4. See, e.g., Eskenazi, Redskins Roll Up Records in Second Quarter,N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1988, at Cl, col. 1.
5. Runway Gridlock, Newsday, Jan. 21, 1988, at 144; see also Reinhold, Tiny Airport
Is a Giant Issue, Again, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1988, at A16, col. 1 (discussing the ongoing
debate over aircraft noise and airport growth at Lindbergh Field, including the controversy
related to the Super Bowl).
6. Runway Gridlock, supra note 5. The curfew was lifted to ease congestion and delays
at the airport due to the large number of post-game flights. Sid McSwain, a member of the
Noise Advisory Committee, stated: "That's just not fair, to expect people to endure that to
accomodate just a small number of corporate fat cats." Id.
7. These are defined and discussed more fully infra notes 21, 36-44 and accompanying
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land have given rise to a more meaningful contest involving the biggest team in Washington, D.C.8 and scores of airport proprietors
claiming home field advantage entitles them to defend against aircraft noise.9 This Note explores the aircraft noise/airport access
problem and attempts to focus the kind of attention on it that is
usually reserved for a Super Bowl.10
I.

INTRODUCTION

Airports 1988.11 Unlike the motion pictures of similar titles that
preceded it, 12 this airport drama is real and the consequences and
implications of its resolution are significant. Simply put, the national
air transportation system is facing a shortage of airport capacity 3
that has been called "the single greatest challenge facing the nation's aviation system." 14 Capacity has become inadequate as air
text.
8.

The federal government that is, specifically the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), which, like the Miami Dolphin's offense, prefers to win through the air. See, e.g.,
SPORT, Aug. 1987, at 41, col. 1 (discussing the Dolphin's tendency to move the ball in the air
rather than on the ground).

9. As is often the case in the sporting world, the home team proprietors have the support of their noise conscious partisans while the federal government generally have the cooper-

ation of the visiting airlines. For a fuller analysis see infra notes 32-69 and accompanying text.
10.

See Eskenazi, supra note 4 (reporting that over 125 million people watched the tele-

cast of Super Bowl XXII).
11. A concise report of the air transportation system related issues facing the Congress,
dubbed Airport '87, can be found in Starobin, Air Travel. Trying to Smooth Out the Bumps,
CONG. Q., Apr. 18, 1987, at 707.
12. See M. MARTIN & M. PORTER, VIDEO MOVIE GUIDE 1986 3 (reviewing the original
Airport motion picture).
13. See, e.g., INDUSTRY TASK FORCE ON AIRPORT CAPACITY IMPROVEMENT AND DELAY
REDUCTION, THE REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY TASK FORCE ON AIRPORT CAPACITY IMPROVE-

MENT AND DELAY REDUCTION 1 (1982) [hereinafter INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT]; Ellett,
The National Air TransportationSystem Design By City Hall?, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 1
(1987) (article by FAA's Chief Counsel); Payne, Only New Airports Can Break The Airborne
Gridlock, Bus. WK., May 25, 1987, at 174 (commentary); Wanted: A dozen new airports,US.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 25, 1988, at 32-33; The Late, Late Show, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 22, 1986, at 14; 48 Hours (CBS News television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1988) (transcript on file at Hofstra Law Review) (interviewing FAA Administrator T. Allan McArtor).
14. How Can We Get More Airport Capacity?, Newsday, May 14, 1987, at 94 (editorial
quoting Donald D. Engen, then FAA Administrator). See also INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 1:
The growing lack of needed airport capacity is one of the most important problems
facing the U.S. aviation industry today. This problem will grow dramatically during
the 1980s, becoming more severe at presently impacted airports, spreading to include additional airports and, consequently, adversely affecting even the smallest
airports because of inadequate access to the growing number of larger capacityconstrained airports.
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traffic has grown steadily1 5 without a concomitant increase in the
ability of existing airports to accommodate this growth.1 6 Moreover,
there have not been any new commercial airports built since 1974,11
and only one such facility is currently being planned.""
Though certainly not the only factor involved, 9 the primary
constraint on airport capacity is noise.20 In fact, noise and noise-re15.
DUCTION,

See INDUSTRY TASK FORCE ON
REPORT OF THE

WORKING

AIRPORT CAPACITY IMPROVEMENT AND DELAY REGROUP

ON AIRCRAFT NOISE/AIRPORT

CAPACITY

(Draft) 3-4 (Sept. 18, 1987) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT]; Hardaway, The FAA

"Buy-Sell" Slot Rule: Airline Deregulation At The Crossroads, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 2
(1986).
This growth is expected to continue, and the annual number of airline passengers is projected to increase substantially by 2000. Compare WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra, at 4
(projecting increase from 450 million passengers in 1987 to 780 million by 2000) with Ellett,
supra note 13, at 1 n.l (citing FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, LONG RANGE AVIATION
PROJECTIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1998-2010, END YEAR ERROR ANALYSIS (1986) projecting increase from 372.6 million passengers in 1985 to 740 million in the year 2000). The increase in
passengers and aircraft operations is generally attributed to airline deregulation. See Ellett,
supra note 13, at 1.
16. See Ellett, supra note 13, at 1.
17. Wanted: A dozen new airports, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 25, 1988, at 32-33;
Dallas/Fort Worth, the last major airport built, was opened in 1974. Id.
18. Id. The only new airport currently being planned is a replacement field for Stapleton
International in Denver, Colorado, the nation's fifth busiest airport. This much needed facility
is the result of an ambitious cooperative undertaking by the city of Denver and surrounding

communities. The plans for the transitional improvements to Stapleton (eventually to be
phased out completely), construction of the new airport and the mitigation of noise impacts,
providing a model worthy of further attention, is set forth in detail in, Government Policies On

Aircraft Noise: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-165 (1986) [hereinafter House Hearings]
(including testimony, statements and various documents presented by local officials).
19, There are a host of factors at least partially responsible for the airport capacity
shortage, including the following: outdated and inefficient airspace management technology,
INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13; inadequate numbers of professional air traffic
controllers and underutilization of aircraft capacity, Blackman & Freeman, The Environmental Consequences of Municipal Airports: A Subject of Federal Mandate?, 53 J. AIR L. &
COM. 375, 398 n.68 (1987); air carrier scheduling practices of clumping more flights at peak

hours, Blackman & Freeman, supra, at 398 n.68; One Chance in Four Your Plane Will Be
Late, Newsday, Nov. 14, 1987, at 16 (editorial calling for economic incentives for air carriers

to modify schedules); fiscal constraints and inadequate funding, Hard Facts Behind the Aviation Fog, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at A38, col. 1 (editorial proposing that "an enlarged

trust fund be devoted solely to aviation"); budgetary politics, Payne, supra note 13, at 174
(noting "[t]he Administration has been parsimonious in releasing" the Trust Fund of nearly
$6 billion, raised from user fees, to make the federal budget deficit look smaller); airline disputes over funding the construction of new airports, What's Keeping New Airports From Getting Off The Ground, Bus. WK., Jul. 27, 1987, at 32.
20. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 3; AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE 17 (1983) [hereinafter
AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT]; INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at
18; McArtor Calls for Blueprint To Increase Airport Capacity, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
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lated access regulations2 at airports may even serve to reduce ex-

isting capacity.22 At the same time these regulations have main-

TECH., Jan. 18, 1988, at 61 (noting FAA Administrator's concern that noise instead of technological advances is controlling growth).
21. Airport access is "the process by which airports are made available to all potential
users" and the regulation of access involves restricting use of the airport. Note, Airport Use
and Access, 4 NORTHROP U.L.J. AEROSPACE ENERGY & ENV'T 159 (1983) (authored by Darrel DePue) [hereinafter Note, Airport Access]. The regulation of airport access therefore involves, to borrow from Harold Laswell's classic definition of politics, "who gets what, when
and how." H. LASWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT. WHEN & How (1936). See also 51 Fed.
Reg. 2985 (1986) (Federal Aviation Administration, Proposed Policy Regarding Airport Access and Capacity, Notice of Proposed Policy, Jan. 22, 1986) [hereinafter FAA Proposal]; 49
Fed. Reg. 43020 (1984) (Air Transport Association Petition for Rulemaking, Oct. 25, 1984)
[hereinafter ATA Proposal] (discussing local airport access and noise restrictions and proposed
national policy responses to such restriction).
Congress has recognized the importance of "allocating the use of scarce airport facilities
and airspace" and in 1982 it mandated the appointment of an Airport Access Task Force to
study the problem. 49 U.S.C. § 2223 (1982). The Task Force identified, studied and reported
on three major constraints on airport access which also serve to reduce the overall capacity of
the national air transportation system. These limitations include: noise, environmental and airspace constraints; terminal space and gates; and groundside congestion. See AIRPORT ACCESS
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 11. A more detailed analysis of the Task Force's
findings and recommendations is provided infra notes 376-96 and accompanying text.
Access can be divided into two separate but related concepts: airside and landside or
groundside access. See, e.g., FAA Proposal, supra, at 2986-87; AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 20, at 11. Airside access involves the ability of an airline to fly into or out
of a given airport and relates to runway capacity, ramp and gate positions, departure and
arrival schedules, as well as other flight regulations or delays. See, e.g., ATA Proposal, supra,
at 43,021 (noting that airside access restrictions include noise and flight allocation plans, bans
on the use of certain aircraft and nighttime curfews on aircraft operations). Landside access
refers to the ability of airlines to accommodate their operations, given existing terminal space
for baggage, ticket sales and incidental services and road access and parking. See Note, Airport Access, supra, at 170-71; see also Note, Airline Deregulationand Airport Regulation, 93
YALE L.J. 319, 332-37 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Airport Regulation] (authored by Stephen E.
Creager); Schmitt, Vast Growth Set for New York Airports, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1987, at Al,
col. 3 (analyzing the landside access problems at the New York Metropolitan area's three
major airports: Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark). For detailed technical presentations regarding airport capacity and landside access problems, see AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 112-21; N. ASHFORD & P. WRIGHT, AIRPORT ENGINEERING 148-54,
344-64 (1979). Landside capacity may be used to limit airside access when potential airside
capacity is greater than actual existing landside capacity. It is for this reason that many noiseimpacted communities have vigorously objected to expansions in landside capacity at nearby
airports. See, e.g., Knack & Schwab, Learning To Live With Airports, 12 PLAN. 11, 12-13
(Oct. 1986) (discussing the opposition of residents around John Wayne Airport to terminal
improvements at the airport prior to assurances that growth would be limited).
Access regulations and restrictions are discussed in greater detail, infra notes 38-44 and
accompanying text.
22. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 6; Ellett, supra note 13, at 1-5;
Telephone interview with Alfred E. Kahn, Robert Julius Thorne Chair of Political Economy,
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, & Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, 1977-78 (Feb.
29, 1988) [hereinafter Kahn interview]. Professor Kahn notes that noise limits airport capacity
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tained or enhanced the quality of life in noise impacted areas,2" they
have also raised concerns on the part of other interests including the
airline and aviation industries and the federal government. 24 This
has fostered considerable debate over the proper role of these local
regulations.25 Consequently, America is confronted with an airport
access problem of monumental importance that involves a myriad of
economic, environmental, legal and political issues.
Given the timeliness and significance of the contoversy, this
Note examines the nature and scope of the airport access problem.2"
The Note reviews the history of the federal government's role in legislating and regulating on aviation and noise control issues,27 analyzes the leading and most recent cases on local access and noise
regulations, 28 and evaluates each approach. These issues are further
analyzed within a case study of Long Island MacArthur Airport.2"
This Note also comprehensively evaluates a number of proposals,
particularly those of the past five years, which are aimed at resolving
the airport access regulation controversy.30 Finally, this Note concludes with some insights into the future direction of all the "noise"
and that noise-based access regulations are "another factor that tends to restrict, in many
ways, the most readily expansible capacity," that is, capacity at airports capable of handling
more air traffic. Id.
23. See Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 382; Kahn interview, supra note 22
(noting that the aim of reducing noise impacts is "not socially illegitimate, [as] these are
external costs" of aircraft operations that should be internalized in a rational manner); infra
notes 343-44 and accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of such regulations at Long
Island MacArthur Airport).
24. See ATA Proposal, supra note 21; Ellett, supra note 13. These concerns are
presented in notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
25. Compare Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 396-400 (asserting that local
regulations are not a threat to the air transport system, but are both effective and a proper
exercise of airport proprietors' powers) with Ellett, supra note 13 (arguing that local access
regulations are posing a serious threat to the national air transportation system). For the full
panopoly of views on these issues, see House Hearings, supra note 18.
26. See infra notes 32-69 and accompanying text. The problem is not uniquely American. See, e.g., Mordoff, Munich's New InternationalAirport Expected to Begin Operationin
1991, AvIATIO WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 22, 1988, at 92-93 (noting worldwide airport capacity shortage); Mordoff, Forum Urges Initiation Of Joint Efforts To Expand Airport, Airway Capacity, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 12, 1987, at 49 (reporting on aircraft
noise and airport access as a problem at some foreign airports); Proctor, Industry Preparing
for Tougher Standards on Aircraft Noise, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 15, 1988, at
108 (discussing impending U.S. and European action on aircraft noise problem); Sexton, Living With Airport Noise In Islip Is No Tea Party, Newsday, Apr. 22, 1984, Ideas at 8 (recounting violent airport protests in West Germany and Japan).
27. See infra notes 70-177 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 178-304 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 305-66 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 367-452 and accompanying text.
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about the airport access problem.3 1
II.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AIRPORT ACCESS PROBLEM

Aircraft operations generate noise. 32 Because this noise is concentrated at and around airports,3 3 a significant problem is created
for those living near airports and their flight paths, 4 especially when

airports are found in or near residential areas.3"
31. See infra notes 453-76 and accompanying text.
32. See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY,
AVIATION NOISE EFFECTS (1985) [hereinafter FAA, AVIATION NOISE EFFECTS] (providing a
comprehensive overview of the literature on aviation noise and its measurement). Therein,
noise is defined as "unwanted sound." Id. at 1; see also Rockenstein, Aircraft Noise: The
Untamed Beast Part 1: Reducing Noise at the Source-The Aircraft, 2 AIR & SPACE LAW. 4
(1984) (discussing the two types of noise generated by jet engines: the "whine" of internal
operation of the engine and the "roar" of the hot gases exiting the engine); IA F. GRAD,
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch. 5 (1987) (providing background on noise pollution
generally and aircraft noise in particular).
33. FAA, AVIATION NOISE EFFECTS, supra note 32, at 1. Several million Americans are
affected by aircraft noise each day. Id. While there are differing estimates as to the actual
number of people severely impacted by aircraft noise, the figure most recently cited is more
than five million people. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO
ACCELERATE COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FLEET MODERNIZATION 10 (1986) [hereinafter FAA,
FLEET MODERNIZATION]. This figure represents the number of persons ".... exposed to an
average day-night sound level of 65 decibels (Ldn 65) or greater. The Ldn 65 level of noise has
been identified by the FAA as the maximum normally compatible with residential development." Id. As many more people are exposed to lesser amounts of aircraft noise, the aforementioned figure probably understates the dimensions of the aircraft noise problem.
34. See FAA, AVIATION NOISE EFFECTS, supra note 32, at 3-4 (surveying the problems
associated with the impact of aviation-generated noise, including nuisances such as interference with the enjoyment and use of property, the disturbance of sleep and lower property
values). For a discussion of more severe health effects of aviation noise than the FAA study
addressed, including hearing loss and possible ties to birth defects, death rates and mental
health, see S. REP. No. 92-1160, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4655, 4655-57; F. GRAD, supra note 32, at § 5.01(1); Bell & Bell, Airport
Noise: Legal Developments and Economic Alternatives, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 607, 608-11 (1980);
Terry, Health and Noise, EPA J., Oct. 1979, at 10; Ingrassia, Study Links Death Rate, Jet
Noise, Newsday, Aug. 26, 1978, at 9 (reporting on a comparative study which found mortality
rates higher in the test community nearer to Los Angeles Airport); see also Sochor, Down with
decibels!, UNESCO COURIER, April 1978, reprinted in SOCIAL ISSUES RESOURCES SERIES, I
TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE 67 (1980). The author puts the airport noise problem in
perspective:
There is nothing like noise to make a noise. While most people don't care a decibel
about aircraft nuisances as long as they are not bothered themselves, the roar of
planes at many airports is real enough for those living close by. Distant echoes are
also heard by airline executives and international aviation bodies concerned with
safe and efficient air transport.
Id.
35. See, e.g., Helms, Noise Pollution and Airport Regulation, 47 J. AIR L. & CoM. 405,
408-09 (1982). Former FAA Administrator Helms discusses two possibilities explaining the
siting of airports. First, there may have been existing residential areas around the site on
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Airport proprietors are liable for the consequences of aircraft
noise,3 and the amount of this liability is staggering. 7 Consewhich an airport has grown or was later developed. Second, perhaps due to a failure of local
planning efforts or poor home site selection by developers and consumers, residences were built
around a preexisting airport. Id. See also Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 377-78
(explaining how unforeseeability of jet aircraft and its impact is responsible for much of the
airport noise problem); Note, Airport Noise: How State and Local Governments Can Protect
Airports from Urban Encroachment, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 309, 310-11 (authored by Jeffrey
Schoen) (describing the process of urban encroachment around airports and how the growth of
the airport may fuel community growth and vice versa, thus exacerbating eventual noise impacts). For an older, yet still useful, look at the conflict between airports and residential development, see Dworkin, PlanningFor Airports In Urban Environments-A Survey of the Problem and its Possible Solutions, 5 TRANSP. L.J. 183 (1973).
36. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). In Griggs, the Supreme Court
found Allegheny County, owner of Greater Pittsburgh Airport, liable for noise from overflights
above plaintiff's property which constituted the taking of an air easement without just compensation as required by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 90. The Court reasoned that the
county as "promoter, owner, and lessor of the airport" decided "where the airport would be
built, what runways it would need, their direction and length, and what land and navigation
easements would be needed." Id. at 89 (footnote omitted). With these powers came the responsibility for the consequences of the county's actions, including the costs of the taking of an air
easement due to the noise of aircraft landing and taking off. Id. In reaching this result the
Court noted the federal government's financial and regulatory role in airport development, but
refused to find federal authority so pervasive as to render it liable. Id.
Justice Black, joined "by Justice Frankfurter, dissented. Id. at 90-94. Justice Black noted
that the federal government's comprehensive national air transportation plan regulated "in
minute detail virtually every aspect of air transit." Id. at 91. Moreover, he argued that Congressional declarations of "complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space," Id. at
92 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1938)); and the right of every citizen to "freedom of transit in
air commerce," Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1938)); underscore the extent of federal control of, and hence liability for, airport noise. Id. at 91-94. Consequently, Justice Black viewed
the imposition of liability on the local airport as a great financial burden which would frustrate
the Congressional intent of fostering air transportation. Id. at 93-94. Amidst the proliferation
of airport access regulations twenty five years later, see infra note 41 and accompanying text,
Justice Black may have been right about the possibility of local liability for noise interfering
with the national air transportation system. See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
266 (1945) (holding flights over private land "so low and so frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land" may constitute a taking).
Cf. Note, Shifting Aircraft Noise Liability To The Federal Government, 61 VA. L. REV.
1299 (1975) (arguing that the rationale behind Griggs is no longer applicable to the aircraft
noise problem, because the nature of the problem and effectiveness of local remedies have
changed dramatically).
37. See AIRPORT OPERATORS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL, SURVEY ON LOCAL NOISE USE
RESTRICTIONS, (1987) [hereinafter AOCI SURVEY]. Of the 99 airports responding to the

AOCI survey, I I airports of varying sizes reported that they had paid out $32,146,000 for
legal judgments against them on noise-related grounds during the preceding ten years. Id. at 7.
Moreover 23 airports reported legal fees totalling $7,118,778 for the same period. The breakdown by noise mitigation measure, also included: land acquisition $312,456,133 (61.2% of
total costs); relocation costs $70,317,386 (13.8%); soundproofing $43,648,000 (8.6%); noise
monitoring $13,353,000 (2.6%); ANCLUC or FAR Part 150 (noise studies and land use
plans) $8,816,613 (1.7%); earth berms $6,799,000 (1.3%); aviation easements $5,785,489
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quently, approximately 400 local airports have taken some form of
action to reduce aircraft noise or to mitigate its effects. a8 Many of
the noise control strategies employed 9 are access or use regulations
and restrictions. 40 Moreover, there has been a recent surge in the
number of these regulations and restrictions, x which are frequently
(1.1%); other $9,811,045 (1.9%). The total noise cost for all responding airports was
$510,251,444. Id. at 7-13. The AOCI SURVEY, developed to counter Air Transport Association
of America (ATA) allegations regarding the cost of local regulation, understates the total
costs of airport liability because there were a limited number of respondents. See id. at i. In
addition, recent noise cases indicate that airport proprietors in some jurisdictions may face
even greater liability for noise in the future. See cases discussed infra note 69.
38. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY, AIRPORT NOISE CONTROL STRATEGIES 2 (1986) [hereinafter FAA, AIRPORT NOISE CONTROL
STRATEGIES]. According to the Industry Task Force on Airport Capacity Improvement and
Delay Reduction, there were 312 airports with at least one noise abatement restriction in place
in 1986. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 6. For a more recent and detailed
survey of local noise use restrictions, see AOCI SURVEY, supra note 37 (reporting in Feb. 1987
on noise problems, programs and their perceived effectiveness, and related costs at ninety-nine
airports responding to the AOCI's SURVEY).
39. See FAA, AIRPORT NOISE CONTROL STRATEGIES, supra note 38, at 3-7 (identifying
37 different noise control strategies).

40. FAA,

AIRPORT NOISE CONTROL STRATEGIES,

supra note 38, at 3-7 (9 of the 37

noise control strategies identified are access or use regulations). These regulations include state
noise laws (related to airport/aircraft noise control), local noise laws and ordinances, limits on
the number of aircraft operations by time intervals or noise capacity, aircraft use restrictions
(based on aircraft type, noise levels, FAA regulations or noise standards), complete curfews
(complete closure of an airport for noise during a given period of time, usually at night) and
noise use fees (based on the relative noisiness of different aircraft). Id. See also AOCI SURVEY, supra note 37. The Airport Operators Council International reported that respondent
airports employed 12 major noise use restrictions, about half of which are access regulations.
Id. at 1-5. These access regulations include curfews, aircraft bans, slot and capacity limits,
perimeter or distance limits on air carrier flights and noise limits. Id. at 1-5
41. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 6 (reporting that the number
of airports with at least one noise restriction increased from 256 in 1983 to 312 in 1986);
Hearings Before the Federal Aviation Administrationon the ProposedPolicy Regarding Airport Access and Capacity (1986) [hereinafter FAA Hearings] (including only the comments
of representative statements of: Air Freight Association, Air Transport Association, Airport
Operators Council International, City of Long Beach, and Regional Airline Association); comments of the Air Transport Association, Apr. 18, 1986, at 6-11 and comments of the Air
Freight Association, April 18, 1986, at 4; ATA Proposal, supra note 21, at 43,020 (discussing
threat posed by the proliferation of access restrictions); Ellett, supra note 13, at 2-5 (noting
post deregulation increase in access and use regulations designed to counter noise problems
arising from deregulation-inspired increases in aircraft operations); Ellett, Airport Access Issues, 3 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 17 (1987) (FAA Chief Counsel articulating FAA's concern over
the rapidly increasing number of airports with access regulations); Ott, supra note 2, at 28.
In 1983, the Airport Access Task Force predicted that the growing number of noise-based
access restrictions would continue to increase at least through the short term. AIRPORT ACCESS
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 17. As the Task Force was made up of representatives
from the aviation industry, government and citizens groups, its prediction lends further credibility to the industry's own forecasts and concerns. Id. at 11.
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found at major urban facilities 42 as well as growing suburban airports.43 In addition to a desire on the part of airport proprietors to
minimize potential noise liability, the recent wave of local regulations can also be attributed to the substantial political pressure exerted by suburban homeowners."
The federal government has also sought to alleviate aircraft
42. A number of major urban airports or hubs are actively involved in aircraft noise and
airport access issues. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 6 (stating that "the majority of hub airports have some form of operating restriction related to noise."). Some of these
airports are discussed in the case analyses presented infra notes 178-304 and accompanying
text. San Francisco International, Boston's Logan, Newark, New York's LaGuardia and John
F. Kennedy International and Chicago's Midway are perhaps the most notable among the
major airports presently considering new noise or access regulations. See, e.g., O'Lone, Airlines Oppose New Noise Abatement Regulation for San Francisco Airport, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 11, 1988, at 76 (reporting on proposal to encourage greater use of quieter
Stage 3 aircraft and a night curfew on noisier Stage 2 aircraft, and noting industry opposition
due to impact on number and scheduling of flights); Hughes, National Groups Prepare to
Fight Plan to Restrict Access at Logan, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 21, 1987, at 3435 (discussing possible increases in landing fees during peak hours, perhaps based on passenger
load, to ease congestion at Logan and three major New York airports); Hughes, Opposition
Grows to Plan For Fee Increase at Logan, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 26, 1987, at
52 (reporting on opposition to Logan proposal from general aviation and regional airline interests); General Aviation Fights Midway Fee Hike, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 26,
1987, at 52 (noting safety concerns prompting bill to raise minimum general aviation landing
fees). For an example of an earlier case upholding differential "take-off" fees for smaller aircraft in order to alleviate congestion, see Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth., 305 F.
Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
43. See J. Murphy interview, supra note 1 (identifying the following suburban airports:
New York's Long Island MacArthur and Westchester County, and California's Long Beach,
John Wayne, and Burbank-Glendale-Pasedena); Morse, Don't Localize Access, COMMUTER
AIR, Jan. 1985, at 2 (discussing the "terminal" or landside access problems and local airport
legislation developed to limit airside access to suburban airports contending with dramatic
increases in aircraft operations and related noise. The airports identified as such include: John
Wayne Airport in Orange County, California; Westchester County/White Plains Airport in
New York; Long Island MacArthur Airport in Islip, New York). See also Incantalupo, Noisy
Airports, Familiar Gripes, Newsday, Feb. 3, 1985, at 76 (surveying the noise-related problems
around the five surburban airports noted by Murphy Interview, supra note 1, and attributing
their growth, at least in part, to the congestion problems at nearby major airports). For more
specific information concerning the regulations at these and other airports, see AOCI SuRvEY,
supra note 37; FAA, AIRPORT NOISE CONTROL STRATEGIES, supra note 38, at 21-111; ATA
Proposal, supra note 21, at 43021-22. A detailed analysis of one such airport is provided, infra
notes 305-66 and accompanying text.
44. See Ellett, supra note 13, at 2-5. See also Milch, Feasible And Prudent Alternatives: Airport Development in the Age of Public Protest, 24 PUBLIC POL'Y 81, 81-91 (1976)
(detailing the history and background of opposition to airport related noise and development).
One commentator has noted the greater attention focused on aircraft noise as a specific noise
source is due to the severity of its impact and the political clout of the suburban homeowners
subjected to it. F. GRAD, supra note 32, at § 5.03(1)(a)(i). One estimate of the total annual
cost of property value depreciation caused by aircraft noise is $3.25 billion. S. REP. No. 96-52,
96th Cong,, 1st Sess., 3 (1979), reprinted in 1980 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 91.
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noise by regulating aircraft technology, 45 modifying aircraft operation methods at individual airports, 46 and more recently by seeking
to mitigate the potential impact of aircraft noise through the development of compatible land uses.47 This is consistent with the federal
government's traditional policy of promoting air transportation.48
Pursuant to this policy, the federal government has increasingly
sought to maintain open access to the nation's airports and to expand
overall airport capacity.49
45. First promulgated by the FAA in 1969, Part 36 establishes technological noise
abatement standards for the manufacturers and users of aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1987).
See also Bell & Bell, supra note 34, at 636-44 (providing a detailed analysis of the history of,
and problems with, Part 36); Rockenstein, supra note 32; infra notes 115-30 and accompanying text (discussing federal aircraft noise abatement technology regulation).
Largely due to the cessation of noisier aircraft operations and the corresponding increase
of quieter aircraft because of this federal program, the number of severely noise impacted
individuals has declined from six to five million over the past decade. See House Hearings,
supra note 18, at 22 (testimony of then FAA Administrator Engen).
46. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-52, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1979), reprinted in 1980 US.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, at 93-94 (discussing FAA oversight and procedures employed
by Northwest Airlines that reduce noise exposure, are more efficient economically and improve
safety). See also Rockenstein Aircraft Noise: The Untamed Beast Part 2: OperationalMethods for Reducing and Spreading Aircraft Noise, 2 AIR & SPACE LAw. 3 (1985). Such operational methods include: the "thrust cut-back take-off procedure" (maintaining slower post
take-off climb reducing noise impact on outlying areas), various landing procedures and approaches allowing greater angle of descent, runway use techniques (using or rotating runways
so as to minimize or re-distribute noise) and flight track techniques (managing flight tracks
themselves to mitigate or redistribute noise). Id. at 4, 19-20.
47. See Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94
Stat. 50 (1980) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2101-08, 2121-25 (1982)); 14 C.F.R. § 150 (promulgated pursuant to the Act, establishing a nationwide program for measuring aircraft noise and
planning for land uses compatible with airports); Note, The 1980 Airport Noise Act: Noise
Abatement or Just More Noise?, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1049 (1981) (authored by Kathryn
Landreth); Comment, Airport Noise: Did The Airport Safety And Noise Abatement Act Of
1979 Solve The Problem?, 52 J. AIR L. & Com. 499 (1986) (authored by Robert Rockett);
infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1 1) (1982), which provides for
"[ihe promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics and a viable, privately
owned United States air transport industry." Section 1303(a) provides for "ihe regulation of
air commerce in such manner as to best promote its development .... Id. See also Blackman
& Freeman, supra note 19, at 382 (noting national interest in promoting air transportation);
Ellett, supra note 13, at 21-22 (describing federal promotion of air transportation); infra notes
70-108 and accompanying text.
49. See 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (1982), which posits the following objective for federal
aviation policy: "The encouragement of entry into air transportation markets by new air carriers, [and] the encouragement of entry into additional air transportation markets by existing air
carriers .... " Id. See also Ellett, supra note 13, at 21-22 (addressing federal goals of promoting air transportation and maintaining open access); Ellett, supra note 41, at 1, 16 (discussing
the FAA's duty to aviation and its conflicting mandate to abate noise, both of which it has
sought to meet while maintaining access and capacity).
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Given the proliferation of local access restrictions,50 there is
considerable tension between federal and local approaches for regulating aircraft and airport noise."1 While federal aviation and noise
legislation and regulation, as well as the case law, delineate certain
spheres of federal and local control, the precise boundaries of these
spheres remain unclear with regard to airport access issues.52 This
imprecision, combined with the surge in local regulation and the resulting industry and federal opposition thereto, has heightened the
tension.5 3 Consequently, a number of new policy proposals have
emerged as possible means of resolving the legal conflict concerning
noise regulation.54 The importance of the legal and political issues
involved (i.e., federal preemption versus a local airport proprietor's
control) 55 is underscored by the critical consequences of airport ac50. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
51. See House Hearings, supra note 18. Contrast the following comments to the FAA
Proposal, supra note 21 (discussed in detail infra notes 411-23 and accompanying text). On
the local side of the conflict, the FAA Proposal is viewed as a means of "muscling airport
operators regarding capacity and use restrictions to the detriment of local citizens and airport
management." FAA Hearings,supra note 41, statement of Robert R. Wigington, at 2 (Director of Governmental Affairs of the Airport Operators Council International, Feb. 20, 1986).
This statement also contested the effect of airport use restrictions on access to interstate commerce. Id. at 6. The City of Long Beach commented that the proposal is "poorly reasoned and
articulated and is probably counterproductive," as well as "preemptive without justification or
legal authority [in the absence of Congressional action]." FAA Hearings, supra note 41, comment of the City of Long Beach, at 18 (Apr. 2, 1986). Air transportation industry groups.
advocate a stronger federal role with regard to access, especially in light of the large investments made to comply with existing federal noise abatement standards FAA Hearings,supra
note 41, comments of the Air Transport Association, at 5-11 (Apr. 18, 1986); FAA Hearings,
supra note 41, comments of the Air Freight Association, at 4 (Apr. 18, 1986).
For some insight into the views of two former FAA Administrators, see Helms, supra
note 35; Ott, supra note 2 (Administrator Donald E. Engen stating: "[W]e can't allow individual fields [airports] to unilaterally change the character of air commerce in the U.S ... ").
52. See, e.g., Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 382 (stating: "The question of
local authority to regulate the environmental side effects of the use of federally controlled
airspace is, however, subject to considerably greater controversy."); Ellett, supra note 41, at 19
(FAA's Chief Counsel, in discussing a recent case, stating: "the scope of proprietor's rights is
not yet clearly defined or limited.").
53. See, e.g., FAA Proposal, supra note 21, at 2986; ATA Proposal, supra note 21, at
43,021-22.
54. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15; FAA Proposal, supra note 21;
ATA Proposal, supra note 21; AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20; INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13.
55. The central legal issues involved herein include: the extent of federal involvement
and preemption in the areas of aircraft noise and airport access regulation, derived from the
federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce, the discretionary authority left to
local airport proprietors acting in their proprietary capacity, and what characteristics establish
proprietorship. These issues will be more fully developed infra notes 178-304 and accompanying text. At the core of the related political analysis are concerns regarding federalism and
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cess and noise regulation.
The regulation of airport access places additional limits on an
already finite resource: overall capacity at the nation's airports.56
Thus, limitations on access to individual airports affect the already
inadequate capacity of the nation's airports, presenting serious policy
questions. 57 Such regulation, especially when increasingly localized,
is said to increase inefficiency and add to the problem of flight delays
because airports are not isolated local facilities, but rather are part
of an integrated national air transportation system.58 It is also argued that ad hoc local access restrictions may impair the overall
safety of the nation's airspace." Furthermore, the noise that impacts
people near airports and leads airport proprietors to adopt access
regulations also affects the entire traveling and shipping public.60
While proponents of access restrictions claim that the health
how, and at what level, these issues should be governed. See Blackman & Freeman, supra note
19, at 381-89.
56. See Helms, supra note 35, at 406-07.
57. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text (discussing shortage of airport capacity and the impact of access regulations). Others have joined in this assessment regarding the
present and future challenge of airport access issues. See, e.g., Ellett, supra note 13, at 1
(FAA Chief Counsel); Manly, $73M Expansion For LaGuardia Terminal,Newsday, Oct. 19,
1987, at 17 (quoting New York Governor Mario Cuomo: "The preservation and expansion of
our airports ... is necessary to maintain-and increase-New York state's share of goods and
passengers. Failure to do so will seriously affect our state's competitive economic position.").
58.
See FAA Proposal, supra note 21, at 2986; ATA Proposal, supra note 21, at
43,020-21; Helms, supra note 35, 407-08; Morse, supra note 43.
59. Helms, supra note 35, at 408 (arguing that the California noise laws force tradeoffs
between noise and safety). See also United States v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786,
796 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that a local airport curfew increased congestion in the airspace
during operational hours before and after the curfew). Increased public concern over the safety
of air travel further underscores the critical importance of the airport access controversy as it
impacts on safety. See, e.g., Maynard, Poll: More Express A Fear of Flying,Newsday, Sept.
2, 1987, at 5 (discussing nationwide Gallup Survey in which 63% of those surveyed had less
confidence in airline safety than they did a few years prior, contrasted with 15% who felt more
secure).
60. Indeed, air freight lines and those businesses and individuals who use them may be
most severely affected by access and noise regulations because freight carriers generally use
noisier aircraft and are heavily dependent on less frequent, primarily night flights often barred
by curfews. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 18, at 508, 522, 531, 543, 578, 740, 759
(reprinting testimony and statements of representatives of various air freight interests); P.
SMITH, AIR FREIGHT: OPERATIONS, MARKETING AND ECONOMICS 175-78 (1974) (stressing the
uniqueness of the impact of noise and access regulations on air freight operators). See also
Mecham, UPS Introduces 757 Freighters To Expand Service, Constrain Noise, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 14, 1987, at 49, 52 (reporting air courier's purchase of relatively
quiet aircraft in large measure due to interest in averting noise regulations and related adverse
political pressures).
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benefits they provide are worthwhile, 1 opponents of access restrictions point to the significant economic consequences of such regulation. 2 For instance, the cost of flight delays due to capacity limits,
and perhaps exacerbated by access regulations, has been estimated
to run in the billions of dollars.6 3 It is further argued that access
regulations may cripple the air transportation system and stifle economic development6 4 by fostering a decrease in aviation-related economic growth and a corresponding increase in unemployment.6 5 Or,

as the Second Circuit warned in British Airways Board v. Port Authority,66 the proliferation of local access restrictions, with the accompanying "likelihood of multiple, inconsistent rules would be a
dagger pointed at the heart of commerce . *...
1"7 Perhaps most importantly, these regulations are seen as undermining the positive features of airline deregulation, including freedom of market entry and
exit and greater reliance on market forces.68 In addition to these
61.

See generally, Bell & Bell, supra note 34 (discussing the impacts and human health

effects of aircraft noise); Knack & Schwab, supra note 21 (discussing how communities
around John Wayne Airport in Orange County California supported access restrictions to prevent a greater intensification of noise impacts); infra notes 343-44 and accompanying text
(discussing effectiveness of such regulations at Long Island MacArthur Airport).
62. See FAA Proposal, supra note 21, at 2986; ATA Proposal, supra note 21, at 43,020.
See generally Helms, supra note 35 (discussing both the economic impact to the local communities as well as the effect on the national air transport system).
63. See INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 1 (projecting the costs of air
carrier delays to be $2.7 billion a year by 1991). On a more positive note, the exacerbated
delay problems have prompted new commercial ventures at large airports including the provision of business service and health centers to help beleaguered travelers make the most of their
"downtime." Eichler, A Wait That's Worth the Wait, ESQUIRE, Sept. 1987, at 80. Fine,
Change of Venue, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 30, 1987, at 36, col. 1.
64. Helms, supra note 35, at 405.
65. Id. at 406-07. For an example of the economic benefits of aviation, the Helms cites
New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport as the largest employer on Long Island
which generates over $400 million a year in wages and handles $3 billion a year in trade. Id.
at 407. See also LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD, LONG ISLAND MACARTHUR
AIRPORT: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND IMPACT ON SURROUNDING AREA 46 (1984)[hereinafter
LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD](concluding that Long Island MacArthur Air-

port, once an under-utilized suburban facility and still dwarfed by the likes of JFK and LaGuardia, generates direct and spin-off economic benefits of $2 billion a year. Note, however,
that this figure has been disputed by community groups). Long Island MacArthur Airport is
discussed more fully infra notes 305-66 and accompanying text.
66. 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 83.
68. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 15, at 14-17 (discussing the threat to the pro-competitive portions of airline deregulation posed by increasing local regulation of access); Kahn
interview, supra note 22 (explaining that the benefits of deregulation are threatened by restrictions on access which also constrain competition, particularly in markets dominated by one or
two air carriers). See also infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussing
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macroeconomic costs, airline industry and federal challenges to access regulations have consumed large amounts of time and money
for the parties involved.69
These direct and spillover economic effects of airport access regula-

tions may have nationwide repercussions beyond the confines of a
particular noise-impacted area. Consequently, the noise-based air-

port access controversy is a problem of considerable national, as well
as local, concern.

deregulation).
69. See Ellett, supra note 13, at 22-25 (discussing time consuming processes, costs, and
noting problems associated with judicial decisions setting national air transportation policy);
Air Freight Group Votes Fund To Fight Airport Restrictions,AIRPORTS, June 17, 1986, at 43
(discussing Air Freight Association's decision to create a fund to challenge airport access regulations). But see Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 398 (arguing litigation costs do not
mean access regulations are any less necessary or justifiable). Note that due to the costs of
such litigation, air carriers often seek federal intervention through litigation or withdrawal of
grant monies. Ellett, supra note 13, at 13-14. In addition, a recent case has greatly reduced
private rights of action against airport regulations. Id. at 26-27, citing Montauk-Caribbean
Airways v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986).
The noise-impacted property owner nuisance and inverse condemnation suits are perhaps
more costly than airline industry actions against noise and access regulations. See, e.g., AOCI
SURVEY, supra note 37, at 13; Bell & Bell, supra note 34, at 617-19. If successfully litigated
by those seeking relief from excessive noise, these suits may also have an effect on airport
access and noise as well as providing monetary relief for noise-impacted residents. For examples of inverse condemnation and nuisance suits, otherwise beyond the scope of this Note, see
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (inverse condemnation); Greater Westchester
Home Owners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) (inverse condemnation and nuisance including damages for emotional distress). Some more recent state cases evidence an expanding judicial bases for liability in certain jurisdictions. See, e.g., Alaska v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 737 (Alaska
1987) (going so far as to hold airport liable "for loss of appreciation in property" value when
that value "would have been realized as of the date of the taking" or inverse condemnation);
Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1200 (1986) (holding that inverse condemnation
action could be maintained against airport authority which lacked power of eminent domain
and that airport noise could be treated as a continuing, rather than permanent, nuisance). For
additional insight into this general area and the Baker case in particular, see Werlich & Krinsky, Recent Developments in Aircraft Noise Law, 18 URB. LAW. 863 (1986) (discussing inverse condemnation and nuisance as well as possible defenses to these actions); Kelley & Ham,
Flying High Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority Redefines The Nuisance
Doctrine, L.A. LAw. 9 (Mar. 1986) (article by attorneys for the airport authority arguing that
the Baker court went too far); Note, Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority:
The California Approach to Inverse Condemnation and Nuisance, 17 PAc. L.J. 981 (1986)
"(authored by Lisa Kirk) (providing a detailed analysis of Baker). A most thorough account of
airport noise litigation can be found in Berger, Airport Noise in the 1980s: It's Time For
Airport Operators To Acknowledge the Injury They Inflict On Neighbors, INST. ON PLAN.,
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN Ch. 10 (1987).
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FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT WITH AIRPORT ACCESS AND NOISE

ISSUES

For the purposes of this Note, federal legislation and regulation
are organized into two categories. The first category includes the essential access-related areas of aviation in general, economic regulation of the airlines, and the development of airports and the national
air transportation system. The second category focuses solely on
noise.
A. Airport Access Related Legislation
The history of air transportation in the United States is marked
by a continuously close relationship between airlines and the federal
government.7 °
Federal involvement in the airline industry dates back to the first
airmail deliveries in 1918. 71 Later, as the industry grew, air traffic
safety and airline passenger travel became key areas of federal policy concern. 72 For instance, in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 73

Congress declared that there existed a "public right of freedom of..
air navigation through navigable airspace." 74
In the 1930's the instability created by an increasingly competitive environment in the airline industry75 inspired the larger air carriers to form the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) to
70. S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1978). See also Ellett, supra note 41, at
16 (stating the federal government has always sought to foster "a vital and efficient air commerce system").
71.

See P. BIEDERMAN, THE U. S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: END OF AN ERA ix (1982). See

also W. LEARY, AERIAL PIONEERS: THE US. AIR MAIL SERVICE 1918-1927 239 (1985) (concluding that the air mail experience was critical to the development and expansion of air transportation in the U.S.).
72. P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 71, at x-xii.
73. 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
74. Id. The 1926 Act also stated: "It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Commerce to
foster air commerce .... To encourage the establishment of airports, civil airways and other
air navigation facilities." Id. The Act was applauded by the industry that had sought such
governmental intervention. W. LEARY, supra note 71, at 227. While the Act marked a key
point in federal efforts to aid air navigation, little funding assistance was given localities until
the 1930s. R. BILSTEIN, FLIGHT PATTERNS: TRENDS OF AERONAUTICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1918-1929 135-38 (1983). See also H. HOTCHKISS, A TREATISE ON AVIATION
LAw 77-83 (2d ed. 1938) (discussing theoretical underpinnings of 1926 Act and the primary
use of the commerce power as justification for the Act); C. SOLBERG, CONQUEST OF THE SKIES:
A HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN AMERICA (1979) (providing an informal legislative
history and background of developments in the 1920s and 1930s as well as through to the late

1970s).
75. P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 71, at x.
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lobby Congress for protective legislation. Reflecting a political consensus that the infant airline industry would benefit from some sort
of governmental regulation," the Civil Aeronautics Authority
(CAA), a portion of which later became the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), was created by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.78 The Act
gave the CAA the authority to set airline fares, establish airline
routes, and determine which airlines could service a particular

route.79 The Act thus gave the CAA authority to regulate airlines
and, consequently, airport access.8 0
The Federal Aviation Act of 19581 completely recodified the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and U.S. aviation law.82 The Act created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 83 sought to further
promote air transportation and safety," and provided for every citizen's right to "freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of
76. Id.
77. 4 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES, 2983-87 (B. Schwartz, ed. 1973) (commenting on the Civil Aeronautics Act).

There was, however, considerable controversy over who should be responsible for the regulation of the airline industry. President Roosevelt wanted the industry to come under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Congressional leaders preferred the
establishment of a new independent regulatory agency. Id. at 2983-87. At the time, the ICC
was already responsible for the regulation of railroads, and adding the airlines to its jurisdiction might have enabled the ICC to promote the development of one industry over another. On
the other hand, delegation of airline regulation to the ICC may have resulted in more comprehensive and consistent regulation of the transportation industry.
78. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 401-722 (1982)). For a detailed presentation of the CAB's history and the regulation of air transport in the United States, see R. BURKHARDT, CAB-THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (1974); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFEC-

TIONS (1970); R. CAVES, AIR TRASPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY STUDY (1962).
79. R. BURKHARDT, supra note 78, at 7-9; see P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 71, at xii.
80. P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 71, at xii. Determining what markets the airlines could
service gave the CAB initial authority with regard to what airports an airline had access to.
See also, Ferrar, Route Assignments and the CAB, 5 TRANSP. LJ. 215, 215 (1973) (stating:
"Between any two nodes in the air transport network, the C.A.B. specifies the desirable flight
frequency."). For an application of the CAB's power to determine access, see Airport Comm'n
of Forsyth County v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962)(consolidating access
to one airport in a region).
81. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). See H. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3741 (discussing legislative history of the act).
82. 5 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 3229-30 (commenting on the Federal Aviation
Act).
83. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)).
84. Id.
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the United States." 5 The Act expanded federal regulation of aircraft operations to preempt state action with regard to aircraft in
flight.8 " Its legislative history, however, indicates that airport proprietors were to retain the power to reasonably regulate the use of their
airports, perhaps in order to control aircraft noise.87
Twenty years later, the need for regulatory reform with regard
to the airline industry became apparent; the smallest major air carrier was larger than the entire industry had been in 1938.88 While
the industry and union interests served by the existing regulatory
system were staunch foes of deregulation,89 the diverse supporters of
airline deregulation (including business leaders, consumer groups,
small air carriers, liberals and conservatives) eventually succeeded.90
After several years of debate over the extent of regulatory reform,
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) became law.9 1 The
ADA was enacted despite an effort on the part of the House of Representatives to link its passage to new federal noise control
legislation. 2
85. 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982).
86. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (a) (1982); S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6,
13-15, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3741, 3741-43, 3754-55.
87. See H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN . NEws 3741; see also S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1968 US.
CODE CONG.

& ADMIN. NEvS 2688, 2693-94 (noting that the Aircraft Noise Abatement Act

of 1968 amending the 1958 Federal Aviation Act was not intended to alter the rights of airport proprietors, to regulate their airports so as to establish permissible noise levels).
88. Regulatory Reform In Air Transportation:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,94th Cong., 2d Sess.
230 (1976) (statement of William T. Coleman, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Transp.).
89. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform In Air Transportation,Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,95th
Cong. 1st Sess. 467 (1977) (C.E. Meyer, President and Chief Airline Executive, Trans World
Airways, states: "The airlines have long suffered from the unfortunate conflict of being highly
regulated and, at the same time, highly competitive. The proposed legislation [airline deregulation] simply worsens that condition."); see also Hearings, supra note 88, at 282 (William
Simon, Secretary U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, states: "Interestingly enough airline management and aviation interest groups are among the strongest defenders of the status quo .... I
grow uneasy whenever the regulated grow too comfortable with the regulations imposed upon
them.").

90. See P. BIEDERMAN, supra note 71, at 77-83.
91. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1982) as an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra
note 81) [hereinafter ADA]. See H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3737 (discussing legislative history of the Act).
92. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, CONGRESS CLEARS AIRLINE DEREGULATION BILL 496-97,
504 (1978). The immediate linkage sought by members of the House was perhaps due to the
more localized geo-politics of the House of Representatives. While Senators have statewide
constituencies and the luxury of six-year terms, representatives have, in most cases, much more
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The ADA sought to foster industry and airport growth by increasing the role of market forces in the airline industry.93 Accordingly, the Act provided for a gradual phaseout of federal control over
airline rates and routes, except in certain circumstances.94 Consistent
with this policy, the Act also mandated the dissolution of the CAB. 95
By ending federal route regulation, the ADA's drafters sought
to open access to all but the most congested airports.98 For example,
the Act's statement of policy encourages both the entry of new air
carriers into air transportation markets and the entry of existing air
carriers into additional air transportation markets. 97 To meet the
objectives of open competition and open access, the ADA expressly
preempted state and local action which would affect airline rates,
routes, and services.98 The drafters of the ADA were careful, however, to note that their intention was not to limit the proprietary
powers and rights of the owners and operators of airports served by
the affected air carriers. 99 Nevertheless, a conflict exists when the
localized constituencies that they are held accountable to every other year. Consequently,
members of the House are more likely to be responsive to the problems of a particular community they represent. In this case, representatives with airport noise and land use conflicts in
their districts can ill-afford to neglect their constituents.
93. See 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982).
94. Id. The excepted circumstances are the cases of small communities as per 49 U.S.C.
§ 1380 (1982), where air service is especially encouraged, and congested major airports where
flight slots are limited as per 14 C.F.R. § 93 (1987). For a complete discussion of the effects of
FAA involvement at congested airports, as well as an analysis of other noise and access regulations as threats to the spirit of deregulation, see Hardaway, supra note 15.
95. See 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982).
96. See 14 C.F.R. § 93 (1987).
97. See 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)-(b) (Appendix 1982).
98. 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (Appendix 1982), provides:
[N]o state or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or political
agency of two or more states shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes or
services of any air carrier having authority . . . to provide interstate air
transportation.
Id. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9948 (1979); 14 C.F.R. § 399 (1987). Therein, the CAB articulated a
concern over the imposition of "different priorities" than those pursued by the CAB's regulation of air carriers. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9951.
99. 49 U.S.C. § 1305(b) (Appendix 1982). The ADA provided:
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section [supra note 98] shall be construed to limit
the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or any interstate agency or
other political agency of two or more States as the owner or operator of an airport
served by any air carrier certificated by the Board to exercise its proprietary powers
and rights.
Id. For an interesting analysis of the preemption and proprietary rights and powers section of
the ADA, see infra notes 212-16 (analyzing Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006 (1lth
Cir. 1983)).
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exercise of proprietary powers impacts on rates, routes, and services.
Arguably, many proprietary actions designed to control noise by restricting and regulating access, affect rates, routes and services. 100
An improper exercise of proprietary powers would seemingly be preempted if in conflict with the ADA or its policies,101 even when the
powers exercised were within the standards set forth by the CAB. 102
Interestingly, neither the ADA nor the CAB rulemaking explicitly
addressed noise in the context of preemption and proprietary
rights. 0 3
Finally, the federal government has also financed airport
projects in an effort to develop and expand the national air transportation system. The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982,10°
like the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970105 which it
repealed, provides federal funding for airport development and improvement projects.10 6 As a condition precedent to receiving funds
under the Act, airport proprietors must agree that the airport "will
be available for public use on fair and reasonable terms and without
100. The CAB's implementation of the preemption section of the ADA, published at 44
Fed. Reg. 9948 (1979) (also codified at 14 C.F.R § 399 (1987)), stated: "[W]e conclude that
preemption extends to all of the economic factors that go into the provision of the quid pro
quo for passenger's fare, including flight frequency and timing.., and we hereby occupy these
fields completely." 44 Fed. Reg. at 9951. Under this operationalization, capacity and slot limits as well as curfews would seem to be preempted.
101. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9951-52. Capacity and slot limits and curfews, as with any limits
on access, would conflict with the policies of the ADA and as such would seemingly be
preempted.
102. Id. The CAB stated:
This ...shall not limit the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or
any interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States, as the owner
or operator of any airport served by any air carrier certificated by the Board to
exercise its proprietary powers and rights when such exercise is reasonable, nondiscriminatory, nonburdensome to interstate commerce and designed to accomplish a
legitimate State objective in a manner that does not conflict with the provisions and
policies of the Act.
Id.
103. See ADA, supra note 91; 14 C.F.R. § 399 (1987); 44 Fed. Reg. 9948 (1979). This
issue was addressed in Western Air Lines v. Port Auth., 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.), petitionfor
cert.filed sub nom. Delta Air Lines v. Port Auth., 108 S.Ct. 448 (1987); see infra notes 26574 and accompanying text.
104. Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 671
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2201-25 (Appendix 1982)).
105. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-43 (Appendix 1982)) (repealed 1982). The 1970 Act created
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund financed by taxes on aircraft, aviation fuel and air travel.
49 U.S.C. § 1742 (Appendix 1982) (repealed 1982). The Airport and Airway Trust Fund is
now codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9502 (1982) (also known as the Aviation Trust Fund).
106. See supra notes 104-05.
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unjust discrimination."'' 7 This provides the FAA with an additional
policy directive and lever for pressuring airport proprietors to maintain open access.1l 8
B. Noise Control Legislation and Regulation
Federal concern over the problem of aircraft noise dates back to
at least 1959.1" In 1965, the Housing and Urban Development
Act,110 noted both the adverse impact of aircraft noise on property
values and the possibilities for soundproofing homes near airports.""'
More explicit legislative recognition of the problem came in 1966
with the passage of the Department of Transportation Act of
1966.112 The Act required the newly formed department to study

and address the feasibility of aircraft noise abatement technology
necessary to mitigate the problem."" The Act did not, however, establish a separate Office of Aircraft Noise Abatement and Control,
biases
which might have compensated for purported institutional
14
against more progressive aircraft noise control efforts.1
107. 49 U.S.C. § 2210(a)(1) (Appendix 1982); see also FEDERAL AvIATION ADMINU.S. DEPT. OF TRANS., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 150/5100-16, AIRPORT IM?,PROVE-

STRATION,

MENT PROGRAM GRANT ASSURANCE NUMBER ONE-GENERAL FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS

ap-

pendix 1 (July 22, 1985). The airport sponsor is required to "make its airport available as an
airport for public use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination to all
types, kinds, and classes of aeronautical uses." Id. at 5. The sponsor is, however, entitled to
establish such fair, equal, and not unjustly discriminatory conditions to be met by
all users of the airport as may be necessary for the safe and efficient operation of
the airport. The sponsor may prohibit or limit any given type, kind, or class of
aeronautical use of the airport if such action is necessary for the safe operation of
the airport or necessary to serve the civil aviation needs of the public.
Id.
108. See FAA Proposal, supra note 21, at 2987-88; Helms, supra note 35, at 411; see
also San Francisco v. Engen, 819 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving threatened FAA withdrawal of grant monies because of a denial of access).
109. See S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2688, 2689.
110. 79 Stat. 451 (1965).
111. Id. (requiring the Secretary of HUD to study the problem).
112. Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-59 (Appendix
1982) (Repealed 1983)); H.R. REP. No. 1701, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 US.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3362, 3421-23, 3427-28 (discussing legislative history of the
Act including an argument for a separate Office of Noise Abatement and Control within the
department).
113. See sources cited supra note 112. Section 4(a) of the Act required the Secretary to
"promote and undertake research and development relating to transportation, including noise
abatement." S. REP. No. 1353, supra note 109, at 2689.
114. See H.R. REP. No. 1701, supra note 112, at 3421-23, 3427-28 (criticizing Congress' refusal to establish a separate office and arguing that it is needed because the private
sector will not control noise without mandates and regulations due to the high cost of abate-
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The first major attempt by Congress to legislate on the problem
of aircraft noise was the Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of 1968.115
The Act amended the Federal Aviation Act of 19581 and authorized the FAA to set noise control and abatement standards for aircraft. 1 7 Congress noted that the Act was not intended to affect the
rights of airport proprietors to regulate noise, or to regulate access
based on noise considerations. 18 As the Senate Commerce Committee stated in its report, a proprietor could still impose regulations,
'
provided such regulations were "nondiscriminatory.""19

ment). See also 5 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 3551-54 (reprinting portions of the floor
debate concerning the Act). During floor debate, Representative Rosenthal, sponsor of the
defeated amendment, argued that the lack of significant progress in alleviating aircraft noise
was due to the lack of industry and government advocacy and the fact that noise-impacted
"airport neighbors" are without effective representation. Id. at 3552. Representative Rosenthal
quoted the President's Special Panel on Jet Aircraft Noise, which stated:
Initiative for solving problems of jet aircraft noise can effectively only come
from a source not compromised by economic interests in conflict with those of the
major groups now involved--engine and aircraft manufacturers, airline operators,
and local governments. And there is only one source of meeting this constraint
which can be functionally effective-the Federal Government.
H.R.REP. No. 1701, supra note 112, at 3422. Another particularly interesting and still timely
quote, attributed to President Johnson, stated: "[A]s the volume of air travel expands the
[aircraft noise] problem will take on [an] added dimension." 5 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77,
at 3552. In light of the dramatic increase in air travel since deregulation, the importance of
the noise based access controversy is once again underscored. See Burnley, Deregulationand
Air Safety Are Not in Conflict, Newsday, Aug. 26, 1987, at 77 (viewpoint column by then
Deputy Secretary, now Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Transp., stating that the number of enplaned
passengers in 1986 is 144 million greater than the number in 1978, a more than 50% increase
since deregulation).
115. Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Appendix 1982)); see also Rider, A ChronologicalListing of Legislation
Affecting Civil Aviation 1938-1980, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 257-71 (1982) (providing a general
overview of the history of federal aviation legislation).
116. Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. 1301-1551 (Appendix 1982).
117. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Appendix 1982). These standards were to be "consistent with
the highest degree of safety ..... economically reasonable, and ... technologically practicable." S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2688, 2692; see also 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1987) (setting standards for aircraft noise).
118. S.REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 US. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN, News 2688, 2694. The report stated: "It is not in the intent of the committee in
recommending this legislation to effect any change in the existing apportionment of powers
between the Federal and State and local governments." Id. at 2693. The report also noted the
importance of state and local land use regulation and zoning in minimizing the impact of
aircraft noise. Id. at 2694.
119. Id. at 2694. In the report, the commerce committee concurred with a letter from
the Secretary of Transportation stating:
[T]he proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local public agency,
as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations or establishing requirements
as to the permissible level of noise which can be created by aircraft using the air-
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In 1969, the FAA promulgated the original "Part 36'' 12° regulations regarding aircraft noise abatement technology, 121 which, like
the 1968 Act, were not meant to preclude airport proprietors from
establishing permissible noise levels.122 Under Part 36, aircraft have
been designated according to noise emissions as Stage 1, 2, or 3, the

port. Airport owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is
nondiscriminatory.
Id. The rationale for this was explained as follows:
Just as an airport owner is responsible for deciding how long the runways will be, so
is the owner responsible for obtaining noise easements necessary to permit the landing and takeoff of the aircraft. The Federal Government is in no position to require
an airport to accept service by larger aircraft and, for that purpose, to obtain longer
runways. Likewise, the Federal Government is in no position to require an airport to
accept service by noisier aircraft, and for that purpose to obtain additional noise
easements. The issue is the service desired by the airport owner and the steps it is
willing to take to obtain the service. In dealing with this issue, the Federal Government should not substitute its judgment for that of the States or the elements of
local government who, for the most part, own and operate our Nation's airports.
The proposed legislation is not designed to do this and will not prevent airport proprietors from excluding any aircraft on the basis of noise considerations.
Id.
120. 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1970).
121. 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1987) [hereinafter Part 36] (regulating noise restrictions for aircraft and a system of ascertaining aircraft noise). For a good summation of the specific requirements of the Part 36 aircraft noise standards, see S. REP. No. 96-52, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
4-5 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 89, 92-93 (providing a
concise summary of the history of federal efforts to control aircraft noise at its source); Bell &
Bell, supra note 34, at 637-44; Note, FAA Regulatory Power-Noise Restrictions, 52 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 193, 197-99 (1986).
122. 14 C.F.R. § 36.5 (1987) states:
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(4), the noise levels in this part have been
determined to be as low as is economically reasonable, technologically practicable,
and appropriate to the type of aircraft to which they apply. No determination is
made, under this part, that these noise levels are or should be acceptable for operation at, into, or out of, any airport.
Id. As the court in Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, reported, the preamble to the original Part 36
provided:
Compliance with Part 36 is not to be construed as a Federal determination that the
aircraft is "acceptable," from a noise standpoint, in particular airport environments.
Responsibility for determining the permissible noise levels for aircraft using an airport remains with the proprietor of that airport. The noise limits specified in Part 36
are the technologically practicable and economically reasonable limits of aircraft
noise reduction technology at the time of type certification and are not intended to
substitute federally determined noise levels for those more restrictive limits determined to be necessary by individual airport proprietors in response to the locally
determined desire for quiet and the locally determined need for the benefits of air
commerce.
389 F. Supp. 58, 64 (N.D. Cal 1975).
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last category being the most modern and noise efficient.1 13 Part 36,
which required the phaseout or modification of all Stage 1 aircraft
by 1988, has contributed to a reduction in aircraft noise. 124 There
has not, however, been any subsequent rulemaking to terminate the
manufacture or operation of Stage 2 aircraft, 125 but it appears that
such a rule may be forthcoming.12" In addition, no Stage 4 aircraft
noise abatement technology has been established.127 Thus, despite
decreasing noise by eliminating Stage 1 aircraft, 128 the long term
implementation of this program has drawn criticism from those seeking relief from noise. 129 On the other hand, the high costs of air carrier compliance have been assailed.130
The Aircraft Noise Abatement Act was amended by the Noise
Control Act of 1972,131 which was aimed at addressing the general
14 C.F.R. § 36.1(F) (1987) (defining different aircraft types). FAA. FLEET MOOsupra note 33, at 5 n., concisely summarizes the development of Part 36:
Stage 1, 2, or 3 refers to noise standards for turbojet and transport category airplanes as defined in Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 36).
Stage 1 aircraft are those which do not meet any noise standards. Stage 2 aircraft
meet the initial standards first issued in 1969. Stage 3 aircraft meet the more stringent standards issued in 1977 and contain the best noise control technology currently available.
Id. See also 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.301-91.311 (1987) (containing Fleet Compliance Program or
Fleet Noise Rule which phased out Stage 1 operation by 1985, with limited exceptions allowed
until 1988).
124. See FAA. FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 33, at 10 (discussing noise reduction
due to the introduction of quieter aircraft).
125. See House Hearings,supra note 18, at 55-56 (testimony of J. Donald Reilly, Executive Director, AOCI) (calling for a phaseout of stage 2 operations).
126. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 9-12; FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 33 (evaluating the acceleration of aircraft fleet modernization at the request
of Congress); Proctor, supra note 26, at 108 (noting the high probability of a Stage 2 phaseout
in the near future).
127. See supra note 125.
128. See FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 33, at 10; see also Bell & Bell,
supra note 34, at 638 (stating "the Boeing 747, the first plane to meet the FAR 36 limits, is
only half as noisy as the 707, although it is twice as large and heavy and can carry three times
as many passengers"); Note, supra note 121, at 198 n.39 (describing Part 36 regulations and
their implementation favorably. "The reduction in noise generated by aircraft through this
process has been substantial." The author also provides a more detailed description of the noise
reduction.).
129. See Note, supra note 47, at 1057 (the regulations affected only "large commercial
aircraft of future design."). See generally Rockenstein, supra note 32, at 6 (noting that noise
levels remain a significant problam).
130. See House Hearings,supra note 18, at 562-64 (comment of Gabriel Phillips) (noting costs of carrier compliance and that fleet modernization is a decision best left to the business judgment of the air carriers); Bell & Bell, supra note 34, at 640-44.
131. Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (1982); 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Appendix 1982)).
123.

ERNIZATION,
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problem of noise pollution. 3 2 Through this law, Congress brought
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into the
realm of aircraft noise regulation. 3 The Act required the FAA to
consult with the EPA with regard to aircraft noise abatement standards and exceptions. 134 The Act also gave the EPA authority to
propose new noise level regulations to protect the public health and
welfare. The FAA was in turn mandated to review and act upon the
EPA's proposals." 5 The Act required the application of the best
available demonstrated technology, to be determined jointly by the
EPA and FAA on the basis of cost and technological availability.1 36
The FAA was given veto power over aircraft noise emission standards when such standards would contravene attainment of the highest degree of safety in air commerce.13 7 In the event the FAA chose
not to adopt any EPA proposal, the Act forced the FAA to report
and detail its reasons to the EPA and publish them in the Federal
Register. 38 This made the FAA accountable not only to Congress
and the general public with regard to aircraft and airport noise regulation, but also to the EPA.
On a more airport specific level, the 1972 Act also authorized
the FAA to review flight and operational procedures to determine
how they might be used to mitigate noise impacts. 139 While the Act
preempted state and local governments from setting different noise
emission standards, the Act's legislative history indicates that the responsibilities and powers of airport proprietors were not considered,
132.
133.

Id.
49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Appendix 1982); see also S. REP. No. 92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d

Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4655, 4661-63 (discussing the

relative roles of the EPA and the FAA); Note, supra note 47, at 1058.
134. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Appendix 1982); Note, supra note 47, at 1058.
135. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Appendix 1982).
136. S. REP. No. 92-1160, supra note 133, at 4662.
137. Id.
138. Note, supra note 47, at 1058. The nature of the FAA's action and related explanation was litigated in Illinois v. FAA, 832 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Therein, Illinois challenged the FAA's final rule issued, in 1984, pursuant to the 1972 Act. Specifically, the state
took exception to the voluntary aspect of the FAA's airport noise abatement program and to
the FAA's failure to explain its decision not to adopt the EPA's 1976 proposal for mandatory
airport participation. The court, however, found that the FAA's rule was in response to the
earlier EPA proposal, thus no detailed explanation was required. Id. The FAA did though
posit the following reasons for its rule: the unnecessary burden mandatory participation would
place on airports without noise problems and the inappropriateness of using the airport certification process for dealing with noise issues. Id. at 170; see also 14 C.F.R. § 150 (1987) (codifying final rule); infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text (describing intervening legislation
providing for a voluntary program).
139. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Appendix 1982).
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nor were they to be altered.14 °
Despite the seemingly ambitious breadth of the 1972 Act, it

drew strong criticism from Senator Edmund Muskie, a noted environmentalist. 41 Muskie found the Act inadequate in two fundamental ways. First, he criticized the dominant role of the FAA in
determining standards for aircraft noise emissions. 142 Second, hhe proposed an additional means of forcing technology to respond to the
noise problem in a manner that would require aircraft and airport
operators to be sensitive to noise control.1 43 Specifically, this proposal
would require the EPA to set "cumulative noise exposure levels"
(CNEL) 44 that would protect health and welfare regardless of existing aircraft noise abatement technology. 45 The EPA would also
identify airports with noise problems above the CNEL standard. 146
Affected airports would then meet with federal officials to evaluate
alternatives available for achieving CNEL compliance. Next, a report would be drafted and the federal agencies would have to use
their respective authority to maximize noise reduction. x47 Moreover,
140. S.REP.No. 92-1160, supra note 133, at 4663.
141. Id. at 4670-75 (stating minority views of Mr. Muskie). At the end of his comments
Muskie implied that what he described as the inadequacies in the Act may have been attributable to the presidential and senatorial elections of 1972. Id. at 4675. Apparently, the Nixon
Administration wanted a noise bill regardless of the contents and shortcomings of any particular legislation. Id. The Senate refused to give floor consideration to "controversial measures
reported after September 15." Id. The political appeal of passing environmental legislation at
the time was great. See T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972 45 (1973) (White
states "the environment[al] cause had swollen into the favorite sacred issue of all politicians,
all TV networks, all writers, all good-willed people of any party.").
142. S.REP. No. 92-1160, supra note 133, at 4671-72. Muskie wrote that under federal
law the FAA's "primary responsibility is to promote air commerce and protect [air] safety."
Id. at 4671. Also quoted was an EPA report on noise pollution which stated: "[T]he control of
unwanted sound is not a high priority issue for virtually any Federal agency or department
For the FAA, aircraft noise is only an annoying interference in the basic goal of the
Agency: the most efficient, safest and swiftest air travel possible." Id. at 4672. This view of the
FAA's perspective on noise issues is underscored by the words of Nixon administration FAA
Administrator John H. Shaffer who later stated: "[T]o the everlasting credit of the USA, we
didn't fall for the misbelief that aircraft noise is really so bad ....Only seven million people
are affected by airport noise in this country." P. EDDY, E. POrTER & B. PAGE. DESTINATION
DISASTER: FROM THE TRI-MOTOR TO THE DC-10: THE RISK OF FLYING 159 (1976); see also

supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (discussing the relative roles of the EPA and FAA
under the 1972 Act).
143. S. REP. No. 92-1160, supra note 133, at 4672-73. Muskie's comments indicate that
this proposal is modeled after thc implementation plans required under the Clean Air Act. Id.
at 4674.
144. Id. at 4673.
145, Id. at 4673-74.
146. Id. at 4673.
147. Id.
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this proposal would impose a statutory duty on airport proprietors to
1 48
regulate noise.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) developed and issued
its comprehensive Aviation Noise Abatement Policy in 1976.149 The
policy expressly rejected complete federal preemption of aircraft
noise control. 150 In so doing, the policy also outlined the division of
responsibilities necessary to achieve maximum noise reduction. The
federal role remained limited to the regulation of noise at its source,
flight and other operational procedures, the provision of financial and
technical assistance, and the management of the air traffic control
system and navigable airspace. 5 ' The policy also restated existing
federal law with regard to the responsibilities of airport proprietors,
government planning agencies, and air carriers.15 2 The DOT went
beyond existing federal aviation law in positing that the costs of
noise pollution be internalized so that air travelers and shippers bear
the economic burden of reducing noise.1 5a Finally, the DOT noted
the need for airport neighbors to gain a better understanding of the
noise problem and the necessity of having prospective neighbors
made aware of the problem.'" This DOT document remains important as the seminal statement of executive branch policy in the field.
Authorization for the 1972 Act was extended by the Quiet
148. Id. Under the proposal a proprietor could "regulate the number, the frequency and
the hours of flight or . . . impose land use controls." Id. This would seemingly create an
affirmative duty to control noise in addition to the proprietor's existing tort liability for noise.
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
149.

US. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY

(1976) [hereinafter DOT NOISE POLICY]. For two brief analyses of the policy, see F. GRAD,
supra note 32, at § 5.03(l)(a)(ii); Note, FAA Noise Abatement Policy Statement, I HARV.
ENVTL L. REV. 425 (1976); see also Interview with John W. Barnum, Partner, White & Case,
& United States Department of Transportation, Deputy Secretary 1974-77, Under Secretary
1973-74, General Counsel 1971-73 in Washington, D.C. (June 19, 1987) (discussing DOT
NOISE POLICY in general and in particular federal reluctance to assume local responsibilities especially in light of associated costs and noting continued vitality of DOT position today).
150. DOT NOISE POLICY, supra note 149, at 34. The Department stated: "We have
been urged to undertake-and have considered carefully and rejected-full and complete federal preemption of the field of aviation noise abatement. In our judgment the control and
reduction of airport noise must remain a shared responsibility among airport proprietors, users,
and governments." Id.
151. Id. at 5; see also id. at 35-60 (detailing federal response and policy).
152. Id. at 5-6, 29-34.
153. Id. at 6, 60. As the DOT stated, this would be consistent with established federal
environmental policy. Id. at 6. The DOT did not however, provide a specific framework for
implementing this.
154. Id. at 6.
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Communities Act of 1978.155 The Act also provided federal funding
and material and technical assistance for a nationwide noise control
program administered by state and local governments. 5" The program was intended to foster research regarding noise from sources
57
like aircraft and to develop means of alleviating such noise.1
Finally, after attempted linkage to the passage of the aforementioned Airline Deregulation Act failed,' 58 Congress enacted the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979.1" In the latter Act,
Congress shifted its primary emphasis from aircraft noise control to
noise compatibility planning (i.e., planning, zoning and other landuse controls). 160 This Act reflected a policy of reducing the impact of
noise rather than attempting to reduce or eliminate the noise itself. 1 Pursuant to the Act, the FAA promulgated the Part 150 pro155. Pub. L. No. 95-609, 92 Stat. 3079 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§
4901-4918 (1982)); see also H.R. REP. No. 1171, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 US.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7569 (discussing legislative history of the Act). The report
expressed concern over the ineffective adversary relationship that had developed between EPA
and FAA in their respective attempts to abate noise pursuant to the 1972 Act, discussed supra
notes 133-38, 142 and accompanying text. H.R. REP. No. 1171, supra, at 2-3, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7570-71. Consequently, the bill reported out of committee sought to further involve airports and required greater cooperation between the EPA
and DOT. Id. at 1, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7569. Under the bill,
airports with more than 40,000 departures a year and the government agencies with zoning
power around them were required to submit noise abatement plans to the EPA and DOT,
which were permitted to disapprove the plans if they didn't satisfy Congressionally set standards. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7571. Criteria for plan
disapproval were: (1) inadequate protection of the public health and welfare (basis for EPA
disapproval); (2) creation of a safety hazard; and (3) significant disruption of the national air
transportation system (bases for DOT disapproval). Id. EPA was required to monitor implementation and EPA and DOT were to report jointly to Congress. Id. This portion of the bill
did not find its way into the Act. See 92 Stat. 3079 (1982).
156. Quiet Communities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4901-4918 (1982). For additional insight into
the Quiet Communities Act from two key actors in its enactment and implementation see
Costle, A Balanced Approach to Noise Control, EPA J., Oct. 1979, at 2 (EPA Administrator
discussing public education and information responsibilities of states and localities); Culver,
Opportunities in the Quiet Communities Act, EPA J., Oct. 1979, at 6 (Senate sponsor of the
Act detailing the need for community level action to combat noise and the role of the Act in
addressing that need).
157. See H.R REP. No. 1171, supra note 155, at 5-6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 7573-74.
158. See supra note 92.
159. Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2101-08 (1982)); see
also S. REP. No. 52, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 US. CODE COING. & ADMIN.
NEws 89 (discussing legislative history of the Act); Note, supra note 47 (analyzing the Act);
Comment, supra note 47 (analyzing the Act).
160. Note, supra note 47, at 1060-1078. See S. REP. No. 52, supra note 159.
161. S. REP. No. 52, supra note 159, at 11-21, reprinted in 1980 US. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN, NEws 99-110; Note, supra note 47, at 1062.
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gram,162 which provides a standard noise methodology model for assistance in planning and funding for the mitigation of noise impacts
through the development of compatible land uses in those communities which participate in this voluntary program.16 The program has
the potential for the greatest benefit at new airports or those in relatively undeveloped areas, 6 and is currently being implemented at
1 65
more than 100 airports.
To encourage airport participation in the program, Congress
provided that the Part 150 study noise maps and other information
were to be inadmissible into evidence in lawsuits to recover damages
for aircraft noise.' 6 In addition, the Act limited the right of recovery in aircraft noise lawsuits brought by persons who acquired property after completion of the Part 150 study.1 67 Given the staggering
amount of past and prospective airport liability for noise, " these are
powerful incentives.
The standardized framework and required procedure of the Part
150 program are designed to provide for airport access and noise
regulations that are "reasonable, fair, and responsive to the needs of
both air commerce and the community."169 Furthermore, while allowing for individualized airport analysis and planning efforts, participation in the program gives the FAA greater input into access
162.

14 C.F.R. § 150 (1987). For an excellent guide to the Part 150 Program, see FED-

ERAL AvIATION ADMINISTRATION, NOISE CONTROL AND COMPATIBILITY PLANNING FOR AIR-

PORTS, Advisory Circular No. 150/5020-1 (Aug. 5, 1983). This document also provides a good
overview of airport proprietor options, id. at 27-32; and state and local government options. Id.
at 33-39. See also Address by Robert B. Hixson, FAA, Transportation Research Board 66th
Annual Meeting (Jan. 1987) (on file at Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter Hixson] (discussing
status of the program).
163. 14 C.F.R. § 150 (1987). Part 150 provides standard measures of noise and standard means of determining the exposure of individuals to airport noise. Id. For a complete
explanation of the methodology involved, see FAA, Advisory Circular, supra note 162, at 8-24.
164. See Knack & Schwab, supra note 21, at 13-14 (describing Clark County, Nevada,
which used its planning expertise and zoning powers to provide for compatible land use development around McCarran International Airport).
165. Hixson, supra note 162, at 1.
166. See S. REP. No. 52, supra note 159, at 22, reprinted in 1980 US. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 111; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 715, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 118.
167. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 715, supra note 166, at 18-19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 118-19. A person acquiring property after submission of the
Part 150 maps must show a significant post-acquisition change in activity at the airport and
that the damages suffered were caused by this change or increase in activity. Id.
168. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; supra note 69.
169. Preamble to Part 150, 49 Fed. Reg. 49260, 49263 (Dec. 18, 1984) (codified at 14
C.F.R. § 150 (1987)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1987

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 9
[Vol. 16:213

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

and noise regulations at each participating airport. Each participating airport must base its regulations on its noise study and analysis,
and these regulations are subject to FAA review and approval.1 "
However, to avoid an appearance of preemption contrary to the expressed Congressional intent,171 FAA disapproval of a plan would
only affect airport eligibility for grant monies.1
Today, after nearly two decades of federal efforts to legislate
means of alleviating aircraft and airport noise, the problem remains
a real one in many noise-impacted communities."' The problem is
especially severe around congested major airports" 4 and is one of
increasing concern in the areas around growing secondary and suburban airports. 5 Recent landmark aviation legislation, like airline
deregulation, may also be exacerbating the airport noise problem by
increasing air carrier traffic at certain airports.178 Consequently,
state and local governments and airport proprietors have taken increasingly bolder steps to regulate airport access as a means of attacking the noise problem.177 As the following section illustrates,
170. 14 C.F.R. § 150.33 (1987). To be approved a program must:
[1] not create an undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce; [2] ... provide
for revision of the [noise exposure] map if a change in aircraft operations at the
airport would create any substantial new noncompatible land use; [3] ... be reasonably consistent with the goal of reducing existing noncompatible uses and preventing
the introduction of additional noncompatible uses.
S. REP. No. 52, supra note 159, reprinted in 1980 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 101
(numbers added). The FAA must also review flight and operational procedures proposed as
part of an airport's plan. Id.
171. S. REP. No. 52, supra note 159, at 13-14, reprinted in 1980 US. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 101-02. The report stated:
[N]othing in this bill is intended to alter the respective legal responsibilities of the
Federal Government and local airport proprietors for the control of aviation noise.
This bill recognizes that there are two tiers of responsibility and authority in the
area of aviation noise abatement .

. .

. It is intended to encourage airport noise

abatement efforts, and does not limit in any way the airport operator's proprietary
rights .... [Consequently, plan disapproval] would not constitute the Secretary's
judgment that noise levels around a particular airport as reflected in such a plan are
acceptable or unacceptable.
Id.
172.

S. REp. No. 52, supra note 159, at 13, reprinted in 1980 US.

CODE CONG.

&

ADMIN. NEWS 101-02.

173. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
174. See AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 17 (stating that
noise-related regulations on existing capacity have been imposed at 19 of the 35 largest
airports).
175. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
176.

See LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING

BOARD,

supra note 65, at 2 (citing dereg-

ulation as a source of growth at suburban Long Island MacArthur Airport).
177. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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many of these regulations have been litigated.
IV.

AIRPORT ACCESS AND

NOISE REGULATION CASES

A. Nonproprietor Cases
One of the earliest cases in which a regulation enacted by a
nonproprietor was held unconstitutional was Allegheny Airlines v.
Village of Cedarhurst.l17 The village of Cedarhurst, New York,
heavily impacted by noise from nearby Idlewild (now John F. Kennedy International) Airport, sought to prohibit the operation of aircraft below an altitude of 1000 feet above the village. 179 A combination of airlines, trade groups and the airport's proprietor (the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey) challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance, and argued that for safety reasons it was
sometimes necessary to fly less than 1000 feet above the village. 80 In
finding against the village, the Second Circuit noted that Congress
had the power to regulate interstate commerce, including air transportation, under the commerce clause."" When Congress regulates
to an extent amounting to preemption, contrary local regulations are
precluded. 82 Since the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act preempted the
field of navigable airspace,""3 and Cedarhurst's ordinance was con84
trary to the Act, the court held the ordinance unconstitutional.1
In American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead,185 a similar case
involving another suburban community outside of John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK), the Second Circuit followed its decision
in Cedarhurst"' In American Airlines, a local noise ordinance was
enacted which would have determined aircraft altitudes and flight
paths over JFK in a manner inconsistent with existing traffic patterns and FAA procedures. 87 It was found that the ordinance was in
direct conflict with federal regulation8x 8 and it was thus held invalid. : ' The Second Circuit's decision was made within the context of
178.

132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), a.f'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).

179. Id. at 873.
180. Id. at 882.
181. Id. at 879-81.
182. Id. at 880.

183. Id. at 881; see also Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 401-722 (1982).
184.

132 F. Supp. at 885.

185. 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
186. Id. at 375-76.
187. Id. at 370-72, 374.
188. Id. at 372.
189.

Id. at 376.
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a sharper conflict between federal and local regulation than that
found in Cedarhurst.90°
The United States Supreme Court finally considered the subject
of airport access in Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., in
1973.11" The city of Burbank enacted an ordinance which made it
unlawful for jet aircraft to take off from Hollywood-Burbank Airport between the hours of eleven p.m. and seven a.m. and forbade
the operator of the airport from allowing such aircraft to take off
during those same hours."9 2 The district court invalidated the ordinances, 193 and the court of appeals affirmed.194 The Supreme Court
affirmed, noting that although federal legislation (including the
Noise Control Act of 1972) contained no express preemption provisions,19 5 the "pervasive nature" of federal regulation of aircraft noise
made a finding of federal preemption necessary. 198 To support its
conclusion, the Court quoted Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota:97 "Federal control is intensive and
exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds.
They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection,
in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate
system of federal commands.' 98 The Court also noted that upholding the ordinance might lead to increasingly fractionalized local control over air traffic, increased congestion in the navigable airspace,
and decreased air safety. 99
Burbank is the leading case in this area because of what has
come to be known as the "Burbank exception," which originated
190. Id. at 372 (the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which was enacted after Cedarhurst,
gave the FAA exclusive authority to regulate regarding navigable airspace); see also supra
notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
191. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
192. Id. at 625-26. At the time, the airport was privately owned; thus, Burbank was not
an airport proprietor. Id. at 635 n.14.
193. 318 F. Supp. at 914 (finding the ordinance unconstitutional on both supremacy
clause and commerce clause grounds).
194. 457 F.2d at 667 (affirming on the grounds of the supremacy clause with regard to
preemption and conflict).
195. Id. at 633.
196. Id. at 633-34. The Court reached this conclusion despite the amicus.arguments of
the federal government against a finding of preemption. Id. at 627. But cf. id. at 640 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress intended to allow local regulation, or in the alternative that Congress did not intend to go so far as to allow the court to find the "implied"
preemption of local regulation).
197. 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944).
198. Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633-34.
199. Id. at 639.
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from a footnote to the Court's opinion, but which actually left the
question of a proprietor's power unresolved.2 00 The basis of this exception, which has subsequently been used to allow airport proprietors to limit access based on nondiscriminatory noise criteria, is
straightforward and simple. Since proprietors are liable for any
noise-related damages caused by the operation of the airport, 0 1 they
2
should retain the power to limit this liability. 02
An interesting factual twist to this line of cases arose in a 1982
Ninth Circuit case, San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco °3
The State of California attempted to impose more stringent noise
200. Id. at 635 n.14. The relevant text in the opinion discussed the legislative history of
federal noise control legislation and how the federal government preempted state and local
governments from using their police power to regulate aircraft noise, but did not address the
"powers or responsibility" of proprietors. Footnote 14 then turned to the role of airport proprietors as explained by a letter from Secretary of Transportation Boyd to the Senate Committee.
The footnote, in its entirety, provided:
The letter from the Secretary of Transportation also expressed the view that "the
proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local public agency, as
the proprietorof an airport, from issuing regulations or establishing requirements
as to the permissible level of noise which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is
nondiscriminatory ....
Appellants and the Solicitor General submit that this indicates that a municipality with jurisdiction over an airport has the power to impose a curfew on the
airport, notwithstanding federal responsibility in the area. But, we are concerned
here not with an ordinance imposed by the City of Burbank as "proprietor" of the
airport, but with the exercise of police power. While the Hollywood-Burbank Airport may be the only major airport which is privately owned, many airports are
owned by one municipality yet physically located in another. For example, the principal airport serving Cincinnati is located in Kentucky. Thus, authority that a municipality may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police power.
We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a
proprietor.
Id. (emphasis in original in first paragraph, emphasis added in second paragraph). Note that
the Rehnquist dissent did not recognize any distinction between proprietors and nonproprietors. Id. at 651.
201. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (holding airport proprietor
liable for airport noise in an inverse condemnation action for the taking of property); see also
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (providing a subsequent explanation of the Griggs-based Burbank exception: fairness dictates that liability for noise be accompanied by the power to protect against such liability); infra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.
202. Gianturco, 651 F.2d at 1316-17.
203. Id. at 1306. For an even more interesting twist to these nonproprietor cases, see
United States v. California, 639 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (wherein the State of California sought to prohibit additional flights at a Nevada airport by bringing an action to enforce
California's environmental review law, however, citing the abstention doctrine, the federal
court deferred to an ongoing proceeding in the California courts).
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control regulations on a political subdivision, which was also an airport proprietor.20 4 While the court noted the availability of alternative noise abatement actions that would not interfere with aircraft
operations (i.e., planning and zoning), it found that the state's use of
its police power to impose a curfew on an unwilling airport proprietor was a preempted form of regulation. 05
Following Burbank, the court in Gianturco posited a clear definition of proprietorship. 20 6 The definition was based on the rationale
behind the Burbank proprietor's exception that fairness requires that
proprietors retain the power to protect themselves from liability for
excessive noise. 0 As stated by the court, the bases of Burbank proprietorship (or in the alternative, liability for excessive noise) include: "ownership, operation, promotion, and the ability to acquire
necessary approach easements." 208 In Gianturco, since California
had granted the Port District all these powers, 20 9 the Port District
204. Gianturco, 651 F.2d at 1308. The Port District imposed a midnight to six a.m.
curfew on all commercial jet takeoffs, as well as strict noise standards for jet landings during
the same period. The state sought to apply a law which required airports like the Port District's Lindbergh Field to obtain variances to continue operations above a certain noise level.
The state granted the Port District a conditional variance subject to the extension of the curfew at the airport. The Port District refused and challenged enforcement of the condition. Id.
at 1308-09.
For a discussion of two cases under which even the Port District's proprietary curfew
would likely be held invalid, see infra notes 280-90 and accompanying text.
205. In Gianturco, the court applied Burbank and found the state's action to be preempted. 651 F.2d at 1309-16, Also, as the state was not a proprietor, the Burbank proprietor's
exception was inapplicable. Id. at 1316-19. For an example of state action held valid, see Air
Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding noise mitigation
measures at ground level and planning for compatible land uses pursuant to state mandate as
acceptable actions).
206. 651 F.2d at 1316-17.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1317. When an airport proprietor possesses these characteristics, the use of
the proprietary power to regulate noise may be upheld. The cases that follow put these characteristics into sharper focus. Note that ownership alone, without any other proprietary trait or
role, may not be sufficient to establish the exception. See Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711
F,2d 1006 (11 th Cir.), reh'g denied, 720 F.2d 688 (1983) (holding that municipality, which
owned airport but leased it to another party to operate, had contracted away its proprietary
powers and thus had no power to regulate noise or access); infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. But see Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.
1981) (upholding noise restrictions under the proprietor's exception because the city owned
and operated the airport and had not contracted away its right to impose noise restrictions);
Infra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
209. Gianturco, 651 F.2d at 1317-18. When the state created the Port District, it established the necessary powers of proprietorship therein: ownership, operation, promotion, ability
to acquire easements, and capability of being sued and being held liable for noise, independent
of the state. Id.
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was the sole proprietor2 10 and the state therefore could not regulate
airport noise or access."'
In Pirolo v. City of Clearwater,1 2 a local municipality sought
to impose access regulations upon the operator to whom it leased its
airport, and the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion was similar to that in
Gianturco.1 a Whereas in Gianturco the state had granted away all
proprietary powers, in Pirolo the municipality seeking to regulate
access by limiting night operations was held to have contracted away
its proprietary powers, despite the fact that the municipality retained
ownership of the airport. 2 4 Thus, the court declined to apply the
Burbank proprietor's exception.2 1 5 However, a different conclusion
might have been reached had the municipality sought to regulate
access in the original lease. 6
210.

Id. at 1318-19.

211.

Id.

212. 711 F.2d 1006 (1lth Cir.), reh'g denied, 720 F.2d 688 (1983).
213. Id. at 1008-10. The municipality herein entered a thirty year lease to let a private
party operate the airport. The lease contained no restrictions on airport operations. A sublease
was then executed by the original lessee. Later, the municipality amended the lease to require
its consent for night flying. The court found these ordinances and restrictions invalid as an
exercise of the police power rather than the proprietary power. Id.
214. Id. at 1009. The court so held despite the city's claim that as airport owner it
retained the power to acquire air easements and potential liability for excessive noise which it
argued was a determining factor in establishing proprietor status. Id. at 1009. See Gianturco,
651 F.2d at 1318-19.
215. Pirolo, 711 F.2d at 1009.
216. Id. at 1008, 1010. The court's language indicates that had the noise restrictions
been placed in the original lease or been approved by the sublessor, such restrictions may have
been upheld. For example, the court states "[t]he lease was amended ... to permit the desired
[noise] restrictions, but the sublessor was not a party to the amendment and therefore it is not
binding on [the sublessor]." Id. at 1010.
The municipality might have fared differently had it attempted a creative construction of
the Airline Deregulation Act's sections on preemption, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (Appendix
1982) (quoted supra note 98), and proprietary powers and rights, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(b)(1)
(Appendix 1982) (quoted supra note 99). The municipality could have argued that, read together, those provisions only preempt action by a political entity that is neither an "owner or
operator of an airport" because neither are preempted from exercising their proprietary powers
and rights under such a reading (emphasis added). As the municipality retained ownership, a
characteristic sufficient to allow it to exercise proprietary power under federal statute, it should
have been able to enforce its access regulations.
A somewhat similar nonproprietor regulation was litigated in Gary Leasing, Inc. v. Town
of Pendleton, 127 Misc. 2d 194, 485 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1985). After purchasing Lockport Aviation Center, the plaintiff was granted a town permit which did not place any "restrictions or
conditions" on the operation of the airport. Id. at 195, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 694. Later, in response
to complaints about noise and safety concerns, the town enacted a curfew and capped the
number of planes that could be based at the airport. Id. at 194-95, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
While the town conceded that it lacked the authority to impose the curfew, it maintained that
under state environmental and business law it could review and pass upon the airport's opera-
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City of South Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 217 involved a regional planning agency order limiting the
number of flights per day and on a weekly basis.218 Citing the post:
deregulation Congressionally enacted Compact that established the
agency
and provided its mandate, the court upheld the flight limits.219 The court stated that the Compact and the unique nature of
the agency made preemption theories inapplicable.220 Additionally,
the court noted that given the geographically specific impact and environmental nature of the regulation, the aims of both the Compact
and airline deregulation could be achieved concurrently. 221 This last
reason appears uncompelling as regulations at one airport by necessity influence behavior at more than one point. Also, such arguments
could possibly be asserted by other local governments or governmental agencies with federal mandates to protect the environment, perhaps in the form of a post-deregulation grant.
B. ProprietorCases
1. Valid Proprietor Regulations.- NationalAviation v. City of
Hayward,222 is the first post-Burbank case in which a proprietary
regulation was upheld. 223 The city of Hayward, California was the
owner and operator of its airport, and it prohibited the night operation of aircraft which produced noise above a specified level.224 The
court upheld the regulation based on its conclusion that proprietary
regulation was not preempted and there was, at most, only an incidental burden on interstate commerce.225 While Burbank held that a
municipality could not use its police power to regulate noise at an
tion. Id. The court disagreed, finding these laws inapplicable to a privately owned company.
Id. Finally, the court found the thirty plane limit was preempted because it was, in effect, an
attempt to regulate air navigation. Id. at 196, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
217. 664 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
218. Id. at 1376.
219. Id. at 1376-77.
220. Id. at 1377.
221.

Id.

222. 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
223.

Id.

224. Id. at 418. The ordinance prohibited the night operation of aircraft which produced
noise greater than 75 dB (dB is an abbreviation for decibels, a standard measure of noise); see
also FAA, AvIATION NoisE EFFECTS, supra note 32, at 2-17 (providing a detailed discussion
of the dBs and noise metrics. For example, a "jet aircraft" 500 feet overhead will produce 115
dBs); Bell & Bell, supra note 32, at 608 (providing specific information regarding noise levels,

for example, "[n]oise levels of eighty-seven decibels require that two people in conversation
shout to be heard.").
225. National Aviation, 418 F. Supp. at 427.
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airport of which it was not a proprietor, the court in Hayward found
no such preemption of proprietary regulation.226 The court further
noted that the Congressional intent, in enacting the noise regulations
which amended the Federal Aviation Act, was not to "prevent airport proprietors from excluding any aircraft on the basis of noise
considerations. 227 The court also found that the regulation placed
only a minimal burden on interstate commerce, and this burden was
outweighed by the legitimate and worthy aim of controlling airport
noise. 28 In addition, the court dismissed the possibility of a proliferation of such ordinances as mere speculation.229
The proprietor's power to regulate was directly at issue in British Airways Board v. Port Authority.230 The Port Authority (the
proprietor of JFK) temporarily banned the Concorde despite a grant
of federal approval for it to fly into and out of JFK.231 After the
district court invalidated the ban, the Second Circuit reversed and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the
regulation. 232 The court's decision included a strong statement on the
potential problems of local access regulations, warning that a
proliferation of such regulations would amount to "a dagger pointed
226. Id. at 424-25. See Burbank, 411 U.S, at 635; see also supra note 200 and accompanying text (indicating that Burbank left the issue of the status of proprietor regulations

unresolved).
227.

National Aviation, 418 F. Supp. at 424.

228. Id. at 428.
229. Id. at 429.
230. 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), on remand 437 F.
Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977). These are referred to as

"Concorde" cases I and II. For a British perspective on noise and the hostile reception given
the Concorde here in the states, see K. OWEN, CONCORDE: NEW SHAPE IN THE SKY 109-15,
186-201 (1982).

231.

British Airways, 431 F. Supp. at 1217. In what the court praised as a well-rea-

soned administrative decision, then Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman granted

the Concorde temporary approval, on the basis of an EIS and FAA control of airspace and
required federal aircraft certification, subject to certain restrictions, to fly into JFK twice daily
and into Dulles International Airport once daily (the FAA was then proprietor of Dulles).
Neither Secretary Coleman nor his successor attempted to preempt the Port Authority's right
to impose reasonable, nondiscriminatory noise regulations.
Rather than apply its existing noise rule to the Concorde, the Port Authority banned the
supersonic aircraft pending further study of its noise impact. At the time the case first came to

the Second Circuit, the ban had been in effect for 13 months, and the Port Authority had yet
to complete its study. On the first appeal to the Second Circuit, it was the United States, as

amicus, that challenged the reasonableness of this delay. This lead the court to remand for an
evidentiary hearing. British Airways, 558 F.2d at 75.
232. British Airways, 558 F.2d at 75. On remand, the district court found the regulation

unreasonable and this finding was basically upheld by the Second Circuit. See infra notes 23941 and accompanying text.
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at the heart of commerce." 238 The court, however, also noted that
given the localized impact of noise, the airport proprietor may be
more effective in regulating noise at the local level. 234
While the court in British Airways upheld the proprietor's authority to regulate access, 3 5 it also posited limits on that authority. 236 The court established a "reasonableness" test, which defined
the scope of a proprietor's regulatory power with regard to the related concerns of noise and access.23 The court's opinion indicates
that fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations of the permissible level of noise would be upheld.238
On remand, the district court found the ban on the Concorde
unreasonable and ordered its dissolution. 2 9 The Second Circuit affirmed with one modification; 240 it held that the Port Authority had
the power to adopt a "new, uniform [i.e., applicable to all aircraft
not just the supersonic Concorde] and reasonable noise standard in
the future" in the event the existing noise regulation which the Concorde will theoretically meet is found upon a reasonable basis to be
inadequate.24'
2 42
Santa Monica Airport Association v. City of Santa Monica,
provides specific examples of the boundaries of the Burbank proprietor's exception.2 43 The city of Santa Monica responded to an increase in the use of jets and helicopters at its city owned and oper233.

British Airways, 558 F.2d at 83. The court stated:

It is understandable that the numerous localities in the vicinity of major airports
cannot be permitted an independent role in controlling the noise of passing aircraft.
The likelihood of multiple, inconsistent rules would be a dagger pointed at the heart
of commerce-and the rule applied might come literally to depend on which way
the wind was blowing.
Id.
234.

Id. at 84. The court stated, "The proper domain of the operator is the issuance of

regulations or establishment of requirements as to the permissible level of noise which can be
created by aircraft using the airport." Id. (emphasis omitted). However, the court also cautioned that "[a]ny other conduct by an airport proprietor would frustrate the statutory scheme
and unconstitutionally burden the commerce Congress sought to foster." Id.
235. Id.

236. Id. A proprietor possesses only "the power to promulgate reasonable, nonarbitrary
and non-discriminatory regulations that establish acceptable noise levels for the airport and its

immediate environs." Id.
237.

Id.

238. Id. at 84-85.
239.
240.
241.
242.

437 F. Supp. 804, 806.
564 F.2d at 1012-13.
Id. at 1013.
659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981).

243. Id.
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ated airport by enacting several ordinances relating to noise and
access.2 44 These ordinances included a night curfew on takeoffs and
landings, a prohibition on certain low altitude aircraft approaches on
weekends, a prohibition on helicopter training, the establishment of a
maximum single event noise exposure level (SENEL) of 100 decibels, a prohibition on jets at the airport, and a fine for any jet landings or takeoffs.245 The district court found that the first four enumerated ordinances were reasonable regulations necessary to
maintain acceptable noise levels for the airport and its environs.' 46
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.247 Both courts, however, found that the
blanket prohibition of jets and the fine for any jet takeoffs or landings were not reasonable, and that they violated the equal protection
and commerce clauses by discriminating against jet aircraft as a
class and placing an undue burden on interstate commerce. 4a Therefore, even an airport proprietor does not have unlimited authority to
issue airport noise or access regulations.
Global InternationalAirways Corp. v. Port Authority249 went
further in providing a very ambitious, judicially sanctioned proprietor-enacted regulation. The Second Circuit upheld the Port Authority's Interim Rule regarding the number of operations (takeoffs and
landings) per one-quarter year, which required air carriers to use set
percentages of noise-compliant aircraft to meet established noise
budgets.25 0 The court noted the respective roles of the federal government and airport proprietors, particularly the federal government's power to regulate noise by controlling flight patterns of aircraft taking off and landing at airports. 1 In addition, the Aircraft
244.
245.

Id. at 102.
Id. The SENEL regulation effectively prohibited any aircraft measured at a dB

level of 100 or above from using the airport.
246. Id. The district court found that all of the ordinances: (1) were not preempted; (2)
did not violate FAA grant agreements or the airport lease; (3) did not violate the Federal
Aviation Act; and (4) that the first four ordinances did not violate the equal protection or

commerce clauses of the Constitution (but the ban on all jet aircraft did); see also, Santa
Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
247. Santa Monica, 659 F.2d at 102
248. Id.
249. 727 F. 2d 246, reh'g denied, 731 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1984).

250. Id. The court found the regulation of cumulative noise exposure did not on its face
conflict with the goals of the FAA's Fleet Compliance Program, but found that it may be in

conflict with regard to individual air carriers who may be forced to accelerate compliance or
endure economic hardships, because of the Port Authority's rule. If upon an air carrier's application for relief, the district court was to find such a situation, the air carrier would be entitled
to injunctive relief from the rule. Id. at 252.
251. Id. at 248.
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Noise Abatement Act of 1968 and the FAA's Part 36 standards,
promulgated pursuant to the Act, were held to mandate the eventual
composition of air carrier fleets. 2 Nevertheless, the court found that
these laws and regulations provide, either expressly or in their legislative histories, that airport proprietors retain the power to set more
restrictive noise limits if they are deemed necessary. 53 Consequently, the Port Authority's attempt to regulate the cumulative
noise exposure at its airports and their environs, though forcing air
carriers to allocate their FAA regulated aircraft types in a certain
manner, constituted a valid regulation in that it did not conflict with
federal regulations, but added to them.2 '
In Arrow Air, Inc. v. Port Authority,255 a proprietary noise reg-

ulation which prevented an air carrier from gaining access for its
noisier aircraft was upheld despite a federal exemption from Part 36
requirements that allowed the operation of the aircraft. 56 The Second Circuit found that under Burbank, as well as under the Aviation
Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, proprietors were not preempted from establishing "fair, even-handed and nondiscriminatory
[noise] regulations. 257 The court also noted that the challenged regulations utilized reasonable procedures, 5 8 were designed to serve a
legitimate interest, 5 , and imposed merely an incidental burden on
interstate commerce.260
In Town of Islip v. Eastern Air Lines,261 the Second Circuit
approvingly discussed an oral agreement between a local government
252. Id. at 248-49; see also supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text (discussing Part
36 and related programs).
253.

Global Airways, at 248.

254. Id. at 250-52.
255.
256.

602 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Id.

257. Id. at 318.
258. Id. at 321. The Port Authority's rule regarding exemptions for foreign air carriers
like Arrow with noncompliant (Stage 1) aircraft required: (1) that the carrier provide the only
scheduled passenger service between New York and a foreign country with New York as the
carrier's primary United States market; (2) an FAA exemption from federal noise regulations;
(3) a United States Department of State written request for the exemption based on "foreign
relations and national security" and the "unique situation of the airline"; and (4) an agreement that the carrier will make reasonable efforts to obtain and use complaint aircraft at JFK.
Id. at 320.
259. Id. at 321. The Port Authority has faced liability for damages based on excessive
noise. This rule is, therefore, designed to decrease noise around its airports and it has done so.
Id, at 318.
260.

Id.

261.

793 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1986).
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airport proprietor and a major air carrier limiting access (here, the
number of flights).62 Thus, it would appear that airport proprietors
may be able to contract with airport users to limit access.2 63 However, such actions must be undertaken with great care because of the

possible specter of antitrust liability for airport proprietors.26
An additional access regulation case, though not explicitly in-

volving noise concerns, warrants mention because of its possible implications. The Second Circuit's decision in Western Air Lines v.
Port Authority,26 5 sustained a proprietor's "perimeter rule" which
prohibited airline access for nonstop flights of over 1500 miles.2 6
Western challenged the rule as being preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. 67 Western also argued that the rule violated the Airport and Airway Improvement Act,26 8 which prohibited the granting

of an "exclusive right for the use of any landing area or air navigation facility" 2 9 and also required federally funded airports to "be

available for public use on fair and reasonable terms and without
unjust discrimination ....
While the court found that no private
right of action existed under these statutes,27 ' it held that a preemp262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Comment, Antitrust Liabilityfor Municipal Airport Operations: Will It Fly?,
49 J. AIR. L. & Com. 245 (1983) (for a thorough discussion of the subject of antitrust liability
for airport proprietors); Note, Airport Access, supra note 21, at 172-79.
265. 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. Delta Air Lines v.
Port Auth., 108 S. Ct. 448 (1987) (No. 87-333) (order inviting solicitor general to file brief).
The rule was promulgated to encourage business travelers to use LaGuardia Airport. It is
believed that business flyers generally take shorter trips and do not exacerbate air terminal
congestion to the extent that vacationing people do (who travel farther and have more luggage.
Id. at 223.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 223-24; see also 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); supra notes 88103 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA).
268. Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 224; see also supra notes 104-08 (discussing the
Act).
269. Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 224 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1349 (1982)).
270. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982)), which requires, as conditions precedent to
any grant awarded for an airport project, written assurances that:
the airport to which the project relates will be available for public use on fair and
reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination, including the requirement that
(A) each air carrier using such airport (whether as a tenant, nontenant, or subtenant of another air carrier tenant) shall be subject to such nondiscriminatory and
substantially comparable rates, fees, rentals, and other charges and such nondiscriminatory and substantially comparable rules, regulations, and conditions as are
applicable to all such air carriers which make similar use of such airport and which
utilize similar facilities, subject to reasonable classifications ....
49 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982).
271. Id. at 225-26; see also Montauk-Caribbean Airways v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91 (2d
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tion challenge was properly brought under the supremacy clause. 272
The court, however, still found that the perimeter rule was within
the bounds of proprietary power exempted from preemption under
the ADA because the Port Authority is a "multi-airport proprietor. '27 3 Allowing such an access regulation when a proprietor theoretically has the power to provide access at another airport, though
distinguishable from the case of a single airport proprietor, could

conceivably encourage proprietors within close proximity to other
airports to undertake similar regulations.2 74
Finally, in Alaska Airlines v. City of Long Beach,27 5 the district

court modified a preliminary injunction against a proprietor to require that proprietor to increase the number of flights permitted at

its airport.276 After noting the competing environmental and economic interests at stake, the court questioned the proprietor's delay
in planning for airport improvements and the reasonableness and
fairness of limitations on airport growth. 7 The Ninth Circuit found
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986) (holding no private right of action exists under the
Federal Aviation Act to challenge proprietor's denial of access to service the airport on a more
than seasonal basis).
272. Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 225-26.
273. Id. at 226. The court's decision recognized that the regulation could have been
preempted under 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985), but that it also fell within the
proprietary exemption of 49 U.S.C. § 1305(b)(1) (1982), because of the "multi-airport proprietor" status of the Port Authority. Such a construction of § 1305 does little to resolve the
conflict and contradictions between (a) and (b), discussed supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text, and seemingly renders the rest of the proprietary exemption meaningless. That is, the
proprietary exemption, when in conflict with the preemption provision, can only be invoked on
behalf of a "multi-airport proprietor." Given that many access regulations conflict with the
preemption provision, see supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text, this is a significant
interpretation.
The court cited City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1196 (5th Cir. 1982), as its only
explanation for the multi-airport proprietor exemption. Therein, Houston challenged a similar
perimeter rule imposed by the FAA to limit access to congested Washington National Airport
while encouraging the use of Dulles International Airport. The FAA was the proprietor of
both airports. The court upheld the perimeter rule based on the FAA's proprietorship of the
two airports and buttressed its decision with reference to the Federal Aviation Act and other
sources of federal authority, sometimes blurring the two.
274. While the court in Western Air Lines did not explicitly consider this, the court in
City of Houston did and provided two examples. 679 F.2d at 1194. One example involved a
rural airstrip, and the other an actual case involving John Wayne Airport in Orange County,
California. Perimeter rule actions by the single airport proprietor of either airport would be
invalidated because of preemption. Id.
275. No. CV 83-4065 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1986) (order modifying preliminary injunction), aff'd, 815 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. City of Long Beach v. AirCal, Inc.,
108 S.Ct. 96 (1987).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 3.
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that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the
order pending trial on the merits.' 8 This case raises many interesting issues, including the question of liability for noise damages due
to the increased number of flights ordered. Moreover, it opens the
door for future aggressive judicial intervention into airport
operations.
2. Invalid Proprietor Regulations. 2 9 - In United States v. New
York, 280 a proprietor's complete ban on aircraft operations from
eleven p.m. to seven a.m. was held invalid.28 1 The court found the
curfew "overbroad, unreasonable and arbitrary" because it banned
"all aircraft, regardless of the degree of accompanying emitted
noise." 282 In view of conflicting federal law, including grant assurances that the airport be open to all,28 3 the court held the overbroad
curfew regulation to be preempted. 2 "
A nearly identical curfew was held invalid in United States v.
County of Westchester.2815 The court based its holding on findings of
preemption,288 the "unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory and
overbroad" nature of the regulation, 8 " the imposition of an undue
278. 815 F.2d at 714.
279. Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.
1981); supra notes 242-48; see also the Concorde cases, supra notes 230-41 and accompanying
text.
280. 552 F. Supp. 255 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), afj'd, 708 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 936 (1984).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 265 (emphasis in original). The court also found the regulation particularly
unreasonable in light of the sparsity of flights during curfew hours. Id.
283. Id. at 257-59 (listing applicable federal laws and describing federal grant conditions under the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970); see also supra notes 104-08
and accompanying text. One particular federal grant condition provided that the airport will
be "open to all types, kinds, and classes of aeronautical use on fair and reasonable terms
without discrimination between such types, kinds, and classes." 552 F. Supp. at 259 (emphasis
in original). Moreover, the grant also allowed for the establishment of "fair, equal, and not
unjustly discriminatory conditions to be met by all users of the [a]irport as may be necessary
for the safe and efficient operation of the [a]irport." Id.
284. Id. at 265.
285. 571 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (the Westchester County curfew was imposed
from midnight to seven a.m.; thus, it began an hour later than the New York State curfew at
Republic Airport). But see Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Sant Monica, 481 F. Supp.
927, 938-39 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding challenged
curfew as rationally related to a legitimate state interest in preserving sleep); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (upholding night operation ban of
aircraft producing noise greater than 75 dB as not being preempted, nor imposing anything
more than an incidental burden on interstate commerce); see also infra notes 329-34 and
accompanying text (discussing similar regulation at Long Island MacArthur Airport).
286. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. at 797.
287. Id.
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burden on interstate commerce, 28 an unlawful exercise of police
power, 89 and a violation of grant agreements with the FAA. 90
Finally, exercises of proprietary power, perhaps in violation of
FAA grant agreements, may have serious repercussions for wayward
proprietors. For instance, in San Francisco v. Engen,291 the San
Francisco Airport Commission denied an air freight line permission
to fly Boeing 707s into its airport. 2 The airline then filed a complaint with the FAA challenging the local noise regulation. 29 3 The
FAA staff proposed to suspend current and deny future (post 1985)
grants to San Francisco. 9 ' San Francisco challenged the first part of
the proposal before any final FAA action, but this challenge was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pending a final administrative determination.29 5 San Francisco's challenge to the second portion of the
FAA proposal was also found wanting as any such decision would be
within the discretion of FAA administrators under the Federal Aviation Act, and any such decision was not reviewable under the asserted grounds for judicial review.296
C. Summary of the Case Law
Proprietors do not have unlimited power to regulate aircraft
noise and airport access. 29 7 While the precise bounds of proprietary
power are unsettled, 298 regulations must be "fair, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory, ' 29 9 and must be intended to serve the legitimate
public interest of reducing noise at the airport and its environs.300
Regulations which fail to meet these standards,301 or which are
288. Id. The burden results from the interference with and prevention of the efficient use
of the navigable airspace in the New York metropolitan area because of the peak travel time
bunching of flights due to the curfews. Id.
289. Id. at 797-98.
290. Id. at 798. The curfew violated the county grant assurances to the FAA that it
would "make the Airport available for public use on fair and reasonable terms, without unjust
discrimination." Id.
291. 819 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1987).
292. Id. at 874.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 875.
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 279-96 and accompanying text.
298. See Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 389-96; Ellett, supra note 13, at 5-8;
Ellett, supra note 41, at 19.
299. See supra notes 235-37, 257 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 279-96 and accompanying text; see also New York Airlines v.
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found to be in conflict with or preempted by federal law,30 2 or which
impose an undue burden on interstate commerce, 30 3 will not withstand judicial scrutiny. 0 4
V.

LOCAL REGULATION: THE CASE OF LONG ISLAND
MACARTHUR AIRPORT

As the litigation profile illustrates, while aircraft noise at and
around airports is a critical problem of national scope and concern,
the impact of this noise is highly localized. 0 Moreover, it is the
public outcry regarding this impact and responsive political actions
that are at the heart of the airport access controversy.306 Thus, to
put the law as surveyed and the ongoing debate in perspective, a
more detailed analysis of a representative airport is warranted. To
the extent that such a case study provides a better understanding of
the proliferation of access and noise regulations, it may also yield
insights into what may be effective future policies.
For the purposes of this Note, Long Island MacArthur Airport
was chosen for closer analysis. Long Island MacArthur is facing increased pressure to expand, 07 heightened by the capacity problems
Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that proprietor could not deny
access for economic reasons, such as fear of competition or because added service was regarded as unnecessary).
302. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text (analyzing case finding proprietor
regulation did not conflict with federal law but supplemented it).
303. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
304. For an excellent analysis of the extent of proprietor power addressing the commerce clause, police power and scope of judicial deference to regulations, see Blackman &
Freeman, supra note 19.
305. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., Koppelman Hopeful on Air/Rail Terminal, Long Island Business News,
Dec. 14, 1987, at 22 (discussing planned multi-model transportation hub at the airport);
LIMBA Renews Push For MacArthur, Long Island Business News, Jan. 28, 1987, at 21 (detailing Long Island MidSuffolk Business Action group's latest campaign lobbying for expanded
facilities and service). Long Island's only daily newspaper, Newsday, has run numerous editorials advocating expansion of MacArthur. See, e.g., Struggling to Keep an Airport From

Growing, Newsday, June 3, 1986, at 70; An Airport Dilemna: To Grow or Not to Grow,
Newsday, Feb. 12, 1985, at 42; Living With Growth at LI MacArthur Airport, Newsday,
Aug. 22, 1984, at 54; Don't Stifle Expansion at LI MacArthur Airport, Newsday, Mar. 5,
1984, at 40; Speed Up the Expansion of LI MacArthur Airport, Newsday, Nov. 22, 1983, at
40; Don't Wait to Expand LI-MacArthur Airport, Newsday, Oct. 19, 1983, at 56; Planning
Transportationfor the Island's Future, Newsday, May 4, 1983, at 60; Breaking the Cycle at
LI MacArthur, Newsday, Mar. 31, 1981, at 46; Why MacArthur Airport Needs More
Flights, Newsday, Sept. 5, 1978, at 44. These editorials are consistent with a regional objective set forth by Newsday in its ForLong Island's Future: "Here's What We Can Do", Newsday, Mar. 1978, at 61 (Long Island at the Crossroads Reprint) (calling for "Expand[ed] ser-
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at the major New York airports.30 8 More importantly, Long Island
MacArthur is representative of the growing number of suburban airports around the country which are actively engaged in the access
controversy.30 9
vice at Islip-MacArthur Airport to the point where it becomes the primary Long Island
airport.").
308. See LONG IsLAND REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD, supra note 65, at 2 (predicting
increased congestion at Kennedy and LaGuardia airports will fuel the growth of MacArthur);
How Can We Get More Airport Capacity? Newsday, May 14, 1987, at 94 (editorial addressing problem of limited airport capacity in the New York area and the resistance to expanding
access to or capacity at outlying airports including MacArthur); interview with Benito
Bartolomel, C.E. (and former Deputy Director Airports Division), FAA Eastern Region, at
Long Island MacArthur Airport (Jan. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Bartolomei interview] (noting
critical role of MacArthur as a regional airport serving the air travel needs of Long Islanders
who would otherwise have to use over-capacity airports like LaGuardia). See generally
Schmitt, Vast Growth Set for New York Airports, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1987, at Al, col. 3
(discussing the New York metropolitan area's three major airports: Kennedy, LaGuardia, and
Newark).
309. See Morse, Don't Localize Access, COMMUTER AIR, Jan. 1985, at 2 (identifying
MacArthur as a key suburban airport which has responded to increased noise by limiting
access); Schmitt, At Airport in Suffolk, Growth Brings Protests, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1987,
at B4, col. 1 (describing the situation at MacArthur as "a familiar suburban struggle" and
comparing it to Republic Airport in East Farmingdale, New York and Westchester County
Airport, New York); Incantalupo, Noisy Airports, FamiliarGripes,Newsday, Feb. 3, 1985, at
76 (stating the most controversial growing airports, including MacArthur, are found in the
New York and Los Angeles areas. The growth of these airports is, at least in part, due to the
overcrowding at the major metropolitan airports in those areas); McQuistion, Airports' ExpansionRaises Basic Issues, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1984, § 11, at 1, col. 1 (discussing MacArthur and Republic airports); Lindsey, Service to L.L by Major Airline, To Start April 26,
Stirs Dispute, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1971, at BQ83, 106, col. 1 (stating "The controversy that
has surrounded MacArthur's entry into the jet age has, in many ways, been a microcosm of a
growing national reappraisal of public values concerning airports."); Bartolomei interview,
supra note 308 (explaining pattern of localities seeking FAA support to expand airports until
noise issue becomes a political liability at which time growth at airports like MacArthur,
Westchester County, New York and John Wayne, Orange County California, was thwarted by
the same localities); interview with Lee Koppelman, Executive Director, Long Island Regional
Planning Board & Suffolk County Department of Planning, in Hauppauge, New York (Jan.
20, 1988) [hereinafter Koppelman interview] (discussing evolution of Long Island MacArthur
Airport from a primarily general aviation field to a commercial airport and how this pattern of
development coupled with municipalities allowing incompatible residential areas to expand
around airports has been repeated at many airports around the country). Town of Islip actions
at MacArthur have also drawn national attention from the airline industry. See ATA Proposal, supra note 21, at 43,022 (noting concern over town efforts to restrict access); J. Murphy
interview, supra note 1 (discussing ATA concerns with noise-based access regulations at growing suburban airports including MacArthur).
One columnist has argued that the controversy at MacArthur is representative of other
more basic struggles between citizens and their governments. That is, the plight of those impacted by noise around MacArthur is akin to those minorities seeking to be heard by the
unresponsive majority. Sexton, Living With Airport Noise In Islip Is No Tea Party,Newsday,
Apr. 22, 1984, Ideas at I. If Sexton is correct in this assessment, the insights gained from
studying MacArthur and the aircraft noise/airport access problem go well beyond the ken of
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Long Island MacArthur Airport is a suburban facility 310 owned
and operated by the town of Islip, New York.311 Located near the
geographic center of Long Island, approximately fifty miles east of
Manhattan, MacArthur was built by the federal government in
1942.112 MacArthur was turned over to the town in 1945 and the
town leased out the facility until it assumed control of airport operations in 19,52.113 In 1956, the town began efforts to attract commer-

cial air service to MacArthur.3 1
airports.
310. See LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD, supra note 65, at 1; Schmitt,
supra note 309, at B1, col. 2; Incantalupo, supra note 309. See also interviews with C. Lee
Rosche, Deputy Commissioner, Town of Islip Department of Aviation & Transportation, and
Assistant Airport Manager, Long Island MacArthur Airport, (Jan. 25, 1988 & Feb. 11, 1987)
[hereinafter Rosche interviews] [data provided at that time hereinafter Long Island MacArthur Airport data base] (on file at Hofstra Law Review). The dramatic growth at MacArthur
is illustrated by the number of passengers traveling through it. For example, after reaching a
ten-year low in passengers in 1981 (164,336) the number of passengers grew to an unprecedented level in 1987 (1,196,278). Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra. This is
particularly notable due to the absence of, now bankrupt, Northeastern Airlines, which had
enplaned nearly 53% of all passengers at the airport in 1983 and 1984. Id. Consider, as an
indication of the growth of MacArthur, the following passage from a 1976 Newsday article on
MacArthur:
One afternoon last week, as the holiday season drew to a close and thousands of
harried travelers crowded into airline terminals across the country, four passengers
at Islip MacArthur Airport in Bohemia waited leisurely for a flight to Washington,
D.C. Around them, the large oval-shaped terminal building was nearly empty and
footsteps echoed off the maroon terrazzo floor ....
Fresco, Where the Flying is Easy, Newsday, Jan. 9, 1976, at 4A. Conversely, in 1988, the
parking area, though no longer free, is overflowing and the terminal building is often crammed
full of people at peak hours. Fagin, ConqueringSpace Problem at Airport, Newsday, Feb. 16,
1988, at 21 (stating: "The narrow cramped waiting room for passengers flying out of Long
Island MacArthur Airport sometimes resembles a crowded subway car, with empty seats as
scarce as standby tickets to Florida in February."); see also Fagin, LI Airport: Good News,
Bad News, Newsday, Nov. 24, 1987, at 23 (discussing overcrowded parking situation as
"nightmarish"); infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text (discussing growth at MacArthur
further).
311. LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD, supra note 65, at 3.
312. Significant dates in LI MacArthur Airport history, LI DAILY REV., Oct. 15, 1969,
§ 2, at 10. Built on town owned land, the airport was originally designated a defense landing
area. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. The town first petitioned the CAB for scheduled airline service in 1956. Id.
Subsequent town actions to stimulate growth included additional requests for service made to
the CAB. Id. See also Remarks by Alfred T. McDonough, Program Manager for Heliports,
FAA Eastern Region, before Long Island Mid-Suffolk Business Ass'n in Ronkonkoma, New
York (Feb. 26, 1988) (stating that until recently "the town of Islip was probably the most
aviation supportive government in the region."). This general policy of promoting the airport
was carried on by succeeding town administrations through the early 1980s. See infra note 318
and accompanying text.
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Upon the advent of commercial air and jet service in the 1960s,
the residents of the then less populated neighboring communities
made noise and safety concerns major issues. 15 These issues faded
after a few years, as commercial airline activity declined."' Unfortunately, no major corrective planning action was taken to mitigate
future noise problems at MacArthur. 1 7 This shortcoming of local
land-use policy is especially ironic given the town of Islip's continued
efforts to attract air service to MacArthur in the 1970s and early
1980s.318
315. See, e.g., Lindsey, supra note 309 (reporting on noise and environmental problems
raised by citizen groups); Carrega, Proposal would limit expansion, Suffolk Sun, Sept. 22,
1969, at IA (discussing residents' safety concerns and opposition to expansion); Jet PlansStir
Protest and Planning, Newsday, Sept. 22, 1969, at 4 (detailing opposition to scheduled jet
service); Residents Continue Protest of MacArthur Expansion Plan, Suffolk County News,
Sept. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 4 (noting citizens' fears of increased activity at the airport and the
possibility of MacArthur becoming the New York metropolitan area's fourth major jetport).
MacArthur is surrounded by a number of residential areas. Among the most severely noiseimpacted are the town of Islip hamlets of Bohemia and Holbrook. While these communities
pre-date the airport, they were lightly settled until the 1960s. Here, population figures are
illustrative. For instance, Holbrook had a population of 1,273 in 1960, 8,104 by 1970 and
19,414 inhabitants in 1980. Bohemia's population increased from 2,860 in 1960 to 8,935 a
decade later and then to 11,146 in 1980. 7H TOWN OF IsLIP DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING &
DEVELOPMENT, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN COMMUNITY IDENTITY (Holbrook-Bohemia) 9, 11, 67-

69 (1981) (discussing history and demographics of these communities). Other noise impacted
communities include Lakeland and Ronkonkoma in the town of Islip and Ronkonkoma and
Holtsville in the town of Brookhaven.
316. See Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310 (showing the stagnation and decline of commercial air service in the 1970s).
317. See A Belated Building Ban at MacArthur Airport, Newsday, July 31, 1984, at 48
(editorial discussing land use restrictions around the airport and how they "would have been
more appropriate and useful 20 years ago."); interview with Eugene J. Murphy, Principal
Planner, Town of Islip Department of Planning & Development, at Islip Town Hall, Islip,
New York (Jan. 25, 1988) [hereinafter E. Murphy interview] (explaining that town lacked a
planning department in the 1950s and 1960s and that although there were major town sponsored rezonings during that period, attention was focused on the more developed bay communities); Koppelman interview, supra note 309 (discussing town's laxness in planning for growth
in some off-site areas); see also Lindsey, supra note 309, at BQ83, col. I (quoting community
leader calling for town planning and zoning efforts to address the problem of future incompatible development). But cf. Letter from Martin Gach, Noise Abatement Officer, FAA, Eastern
Region, to Martin J. Gesualdi, Jr., Chairman, Environmental & Community Relations, Long
Island MacArthur Airport (July 23, 1970)(on file at Hofstra Law Review) (noting but one or
two noise complaints from the MacArthur area and concluding: "From an environmental point
of view it would appear that present efforts in the structuring of the land use around MacArthur Airport to this date [have] been successful from a noise abatement standpoint.").
318. See MacArthur To Build First Cargo Terminal, Long Island Business News, Sept.
28, 1987, at 3 (terminal built to accomodate and attract freight service); Incantalupo, LI Airport Touted to Travel Agents, Newsday, Mar. 26, 1981, at 43 (cooperative program initiated
by businesses and governments, including the town, to push attractiveness of airport); Moreno,
Radio Ad Campaign Prepared To Boost MacArthur Airport, Newsday, Feb. 10, 1981, at 27
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Since 1981, MacArthur Airport has experienced a dramatic increase in commercial activity.3 19 MacArthur's growth, like that of
similarly situated suburban airports,3 20 has led to increased aircraft
noise.3 21 The noise problem has distressed nearby residents322 and
(town co-sponsored program to encourage airport use noting amenities like free parking, itself
a town policy); Morris, State Told of LI's Need for More Air Service, Newsday, Sept. 8,
1978, at 25 (quoting then Islip Supervisor Cohalan on need to add new air routes); Davidson,
Islip Official Backs Atlanta Flights, Newsday, Dec. 7, 1977, at 37 (reporting Supervisor
Cohalan's efforts to gain flights); Kangeiser, Industrial growth is just beginning . . . . LI
DAILY REV., Oct. 15, 1969, § 2, at 6 (article by then Islip Supervisor Kangeiser stating town's
intent to expand the airport). Note, however, that town airport policy has changed in recent
years. See infra notes 326-66 and accompanying text.
319. Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310. From 1981 to 1987 the
number of commercial airlines serving MacArthur increased from 4 to 12, while the number
of passengers has risen from 164,336 to 1,196,278. Id.; Koppelman interview, supra note 309;
Rosche interviews, supra note 310; see also supra note 310 (regarding growth of MacArthur).
The economic importance of MacArthur Airport is notable. One study has estimated the direct and spinoff economic benefits of the airport at $2 billion annually. LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD, supra note 65, at 46. Tenants and operators situated on airpoort
property have been found to generate gross operating budgets of over $90 million annually.
LONG ISLAND MACARTHUR AIRPORT, AIRPORT MANAGER'S OFFICE, LONG ISLAND MACARTHUR AIRPORT 1984 ECONOMIC SURVEY (1984). These figures, however, have been disputed
by community groups that have consistently pointed to other causes of this economic activity
including the natural eastward progression of development on Long Island and town of Islip
industrial property tax abatements. See, e.g., interview with representatives of the Bohemia
Civic Association (Jan. 13, 1988) [hereinafter Bohemia Civic Association interview].
320. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text (also discussing growth at MacArthur and representative suburban airports).
321. See Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310; Morse, supra note
309, at 2; Bohemia Civic Ass'n interview, supra note 319. From 1982 to 1984 noise increased
one hundred percent at MacArthur. Ketcham, Airlines and Residents Causing Turbulence for
MacArthur Airport, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1985, § 11, at 1, col. 3 (quoting Airport Manager
Alfred E. Werner).
Another indication of the increased noise at MacArthur is the town of Islip's establishment of a noise complaint hotline. Letter from Michael A. LoGrande, Supervisor, Town of
Islip, to Residents, at 3 (Aug. 31, 1984) (on file at Hofstra Law Review). Over a thousand
noise complaints were recorded during the first year of the hotline's existence. Long Island
MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310. During the summer of 1987 however, there was
a drop in the number of complaints recorded. Bohemia Civic Association, Newsletter, Oct. 5,
1987, at 1 (on file at Hofstra Law Review). The total number of noise complaints for 1987 was
also down to 304. Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310. These developments are interesting for two reasons. First, aircraft noise is generally most bothersome in the
summer when people are often outdoors and homes have windows open. Second, this decline
may indicate either the effectiveness of noise abatement efforts at MacArthur or a feeling of
inefficacy on the part of residents.
Interestingly enough, the town of Islip has also stepped up the frequency of its own
"noise" regarding noise at MacArthur. That is, town public relations efforts for the airport
have undergone a change. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the town's public relations posture was that "Islip's aviation minded town government has centered its development resources
and planning on the continued growth of Islip MacArthur Airport." Long Island MacArthur
Airport data base, supra note 310 (taken from a late 1970s town advertisement). From early
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has fostered considerable debate over the causes and consequences of
MacArthur's growth. The town of Islip has continually asserted that
airline deregulation has been the primary cause of growth and that
deregulation has stripped the town of control over the airport. 2
1

1984 to mid-1985 the town issued twenty-three press releases on the airport and its activities
to control airport growth. Interview with Warren Greene, Public Information Officer, Town of
Islip Office of Public Information, at Islip Town Hall (May 3, 1985); see also Long Island
MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310. A consistent theme of the town's releases on
the airport has been the town's conflict with the federal government and the role airline deregulation has played in undermining the authority of airport proprietors. One such statement
asserted that: "the Town of Islip is engaged in a dispute with the Federal government over the
Town's fundamental right to control activities at an airport which we own and operate." Letter
from Michael A. LoGrande, Supervisor, Town of Islip, to Residents, at 1 (Aug. 31, 1984) (on
file at Hofstra Law Review) (discussing town actions regarding airport noise). This view of
deregulation as a factor in exacerbating airport noise problems underscores the importance of
looking at the airport access controversy in light of all federal aviation law, not merely noise
legislation and regulation. Moreover, if economics is at work in fostering airport noise
problems, economic approaches, aimed at reducing noise, warrant further consideration. See
infra notes 325, 461, 478 and accompanying text.
322. See Bohemia Civic Association interview, supra note 319 (discussing noise, safety,
quality of life and property value concerns relating to the airport); Schmitt, supra note 309, at
Bl, col. 2 (reporting on the continued vigilance of some residents who view the situation as
involving the "most pressing problems in suburbia" and the quality of life); Ketcham, supra
note 321, § 11, at 1, col. 5 (noting residents political involvement with the issue). See also
Mintz, U.S. Study On Airport Noise Irks Bohemia, Newsday, Dec. 19, 1985, at 25; Letter
from Edward Kalbaugh, Chairman, CAPMAC, Holbrook, to the Editor, Newsday, Feb. 27,
1985, at 53. Shaman, MacArthur's Growth Angers Neighbors, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, §
8, at 10, col. 1; Smith, LoGrande Lends an Ear, Newsday, May 9, 1984, at 23; McQuiston,
Airports' Expansion Raises Basic Issues, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1984, § 11, at 1, 11, col. 1;
Sexton, Living With Airport Noise In Islip Is No Tea Party, Newsday, Apr. 22, 1984, Ideas
at 8; Letter from Sasha J.Harding, President, South Holbrook Development Civic Association, to the Editor, Newsday, Apr. 19, 1984, at 79; Incantalupo, MacArthur Airport Neighbors Sound Off, Newsday, Apr. 13, 1984, at 6; Kern, MacArthur Neighbors Can't Rest Easy
With Fly-by-Night Field, Newsday, Mar. 29, 1984, at 80 (As I See It column by Vice President of Bohemians for Responsive Airport Development); Incantalupo, Airport wary about
new popularity, Newsday, Mar. 12, 1984, Part III, at 3; Morgo, Airport Expansion What the
Neighbors Think, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, § 21, at 14, col. I ("Long Island Opinion"
column by Suffolk County Legislator Morgo); Freedman, Boom On at MacArthur Airport,
Newsday, Oct. 16, 1983, at 7; Smith, Residents Near MacArthur Say Noise Is Up at Airport,
Newsday, Oct. 7, 1982, at 31. Cf. Hogeboom, The MacArthur Airport Debate: It's a Boon to
Many, but..., N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, § 11, at 24, col. 1 ("Long Island Opinion" column
by resident of nearby community of Oakdale, stressing the economic and transportation advantages of the growth of the airport, especially if growth is controlled to accommodate troubled
residents' concerns).
323. See Letter from Michael A. LoGrande, Supervisor, Town of Islip, to Residents
(Aug. 31, 1984) (on file at Hofstra Law Review) (explaining deregulation and how it has
restricted town authority to control growth). A number of town press releases have brought
this theme home, including the following town of Islip Department of Public Information
News Releases: Restrictions On Overnight Flights At MacArthur Formally Set By Islip (May
4, 1985) (stating "The Supervisor once again pointed to the 1978 Federal Deregulation Act as
the prime factor for many of the problems currently being experienced at MacArthur ....In
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Community groups have argued that the town's historically pro-development policies are responsible for the upswing in activity at the
airport.3 24 While both theories offer partial explanations for the airport's growth, the overriding force has been the size and affluence of
the Long Island market the airport serves. 25
effect, it is the airline industry that is running municipal airports."); LoGrande Stops Airport
Runway Expansion (Aug. 24, 1984) (calling deregulation a "catalyst in unwelcome airport
expansion throughout the country"); Islip Tightens Grip At Airport (June 8, 1984) (noting
town's attempt to "wrest control of their airport from the airline industry"); LoGrande Says
"No" To American At MacArthur (Feb. 2, 1984) (noting airline freedom to enter and exit
markets under deregulation). Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310. For
additional support for the town's position, see LONG ISLAND REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD,
supra note 65, at 2; Struggling to Keep an Airport From Growing, Newsday, June 3, 1986, at
70 (editorial stating deregulation "brought commercial success" to MacArthur); McQuiston,
Islip Moves To Curb Growth Of Airport, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1984, § 21, at 1, col. 1; Incantalupo, Airport wary about new popularity, Newsday, Mar. 12, 1984, Pt. III, at 3 (noting
deregulation made it easy for new entrants into the airline industry and also allowed for market and fare flexibility). Ironically, the town once feared deregulation would curtail service to
the airport (which it did for a few years). See Cook, Islip Airport Afraid of Deregulation,
Newsday, Feb. 26, 1976, at 39. But see Kahn, House OKs Airline DeregulationBill, Newsday, Sept. 22, 1978, at 41 (reporting that CAB official believed deregulation would stimulate
regional airports like MacArthur). See also supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussing deregulation).
324. Bohemia Civic Association interview, supra note 319 (statement of Ms. Gwozdo)
(noting town efforts to advance the airport with planning initiatives primarily aimed at the
commercial end of airport policy and also mentioning the role of deregulation); telephone interview with Edward Kalbaugh, President, Community Action Project MacArthur Airport Coalition (May 4, 1985) (calling town pricing of airport space and services "sinfully low"). Town
established landing fees, for instance, though constant in nominal dollars for most of the
1980s, declined in real dollars. Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310.
Various pro-development policies are discussed, supra note 318. It is not unusual for airport
proprietors to seek to expand their facilities, to a point. Bartolomei interview, supra note 308;
see also R. CAVES, supra note 78, at 108 (decribing seemingly uniform practice of pricing
airport services at or near cost to attract airlines). Thus, such pro-development policies are not
unique to town of Islip policies at Long Island MacArthur Airport.
325. This is the conclusion reached in an empirical study of MacArthur and other airports. J. Gesualdi, An Evaluation of Airline Deregulation and the Growth of Long Island
MacArthur Airport (May 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file at Hofstra Law Review).
This study reports that while deregulation and town policies contributed to airport growth it is
the Long Island market that was the primary factor behind the growth. When compared with
the other airports in the same FAA classification as MacArthur (based on physical features
and capacity and number of passengers) at the time of deregulation (1978), MacArthur's postderegulation growth is an anomaly. The same result occurs when the airports in MacArthur's
post-deregulation (1985) classification are compared. The universal application of deregulation
to all airports and the similarities between policies at different airports thus points to the uniqueness of the Long Island market. Id. If this is true of other growing suburban airports, a
market based approach to the problem might prove effective. Unless, however, such an approach would reduce or control noise as well as it might raise revenue, noise-impacted residents may not be impressed or responsive. Bohemia Civic Association interview, supra note
319 (statement of Mr. Wilhemy) ("can [try a market based approach] but planes are still
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The town of Islip responded to the airport's growth by changing
its policies at MacArthur. Specifically, the town has adopted access
regulations a28 and taken other measures3 27 that have heightened tensions among the town, air carriers, and the FAA. 8 '
One of Islip's regulations, limits the night operation of aircraft
based on noise standards, 29 provides for a fine for its violation, 3 0
going to fly over my head, over my house .... someone will be willing to pay the price

regardless if they want it"). To many residents, limiting airport access is the only effective
measure. Id. (voicing group sentiments).
326. See TowN OF ISLIP CODE ch. 3B (1984) (night operations regulation), ch. 3D
(1986) (noise allocation plan); see also infra notes 329-48 and accompanying text (discussing
regulations and their effectiveness).
327. The town of Islip is preparing a Part 150 study for MacArthur Airport which will
define the scope of future access and noise regulation at MacArthur. Rosche interviews, supra
note 310 (regarding grant conditions); see also 14 C.F.R. § 150 (1987) (as discussed supra
notes 162-72 and accompanying text). The town is revising its Master Plan for the airport.
Rosche interviews, supra note 310. The town's suspension of a federally funded runway extension project led the FAA to withdraw about two and a half million dollars in grant money.
Charles, FAA Yanks $2.6 M in MacArthur Airport Funding, Newsday, Feb. 19, 1987, at 27.
Additional town actions include: enacting a moratorium on residential development around the
airport, establishing a noise complaint hotline, halting improvements to the terminal building
and parking area, Letter from Michael A. LoGrande, Supervisor, Town of Islip, to Residents
at 2-3 (Aug. 31, 1984) (on file at Hofstra Law Review), and imposing soundproofing requirements on new residential construction around the airport. E. Murphy interview, supra note
317. The town also initiated parking fees for non-residents using the airport. Long Island MacArthur Airport data base, supra note 310. In 1987, these fees generated approximately one
million dollars in revenue. Negron, No Tax Increase in Islip Budget Plan, Newsday, Sept. 30,
1987, at 29. Additionally, the town has raised landing rights fees at the airport. Negron, MacArthur Fee Hike, Newsday, Feb. 24, 1988, at 26.
328. See Bartolomei interview, supra note 308 (discussing FAA's frustration with
changes in town policy at MacArthur, in direct violation of the town's prior grant assurances
to the FAA); Domash, U.S. and Islip Battle on Airport, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1986, § 21, at
9, col. 1 (describing divergent views of town and FAA on growth at MacArthur); Shaman,
supra note 322, § 8, at 10, col. 1 (noting that the FAA challenged night operations regulation
barring large jets between eleven p.m. and six-thirty a.m. The town continued this "curfew" by
closing its airport rescue operation at eleven p.m., effectively preventing airliners from landing
after that hour, given FAA requirements that rescue operations be available for air carrier
aircraft to land); Charles, supra note 327, at 27 (noting that the FAA withdrew funds due to
town delay in completing controversial runway extension). The town has subsequently acted to
completely abandon the runway extension and restore the runway to its pre-existing condition.
Town Board action okays runway lights, Suffolk Life, Dec. 16, 1987, at 18C (quoting Supervisor Jones, the "runway extension is dead"); Fagin, Cost of Runway Lights Plan Doubled,
Newsday, Dec. 4, 1987, at 33. See also Ketcham, supra note 321 (describing airline criticism
of town noise regulations); Piloting Airline Full Throttle, Newsday, Nov. 11, 1984, at 88
(quoting Northeastern International Airways President Stephen Quinto as criticizing town's
parochial interest in light of regional needs MacArthur serves and deregulation); Smith,
Northeastern says it will fly in face of Islip airline limits, Suffolk County News, Nov. 8,
1984, at I (regarding confrontation between town and air carriers); infra notes 350-61 and
accompanying text (describing air carrier litigation against the town).
329. TowN OF ISLIP CODE ch. 3B (1984). Specifically, the ordinance bans takeoffs of
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and is similar to the night curfew upheld in some Ninth Circuit
cases, but rejected in similar Second Circuit decisions."' The ordinance also gives the Airport Manager discretion to waive these restrictions under extreme conditions on a case-by-case basis, as the
town recognizes "that the airport is an integral part of the National
Air Transportation System." 3 2 Although Islip is MacArthur's proprietor, the ordinance is drafted in classic police power language. 333
aircraft producing 72dBA and landings generating 85dBA between eleven p.m. and six a.m.
The ordinance also makes it a violation to maneuver around FAR Part 36 measuring points.
Id. at § 3b-2. Note that dBA stands for A-weighted decibels. For a technical discussion, see
FAA, AVIATION NOISE EFFECrS, supra note 32, at 9-11.
330. TOWN OF ISLIP CODE § 3B (1984). The first summons for a violation of this regulation was issued on September 17, 1984. Night Flight Leads To L.L Summons, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1984, § 2, at 2, col. 6. Residents have criticised enforcement of the ordinance. Bohemia Civic Association interview, supra note 319 (statement of Ms. Ekstam).
331. Compare Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927,
938-39 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd., 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding night curfew, but at
airport not capable of accommodating commercial airlines); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (upholding night operation ban on aircraft producing noise greater than 75dB) with United States v. New York, 552 F. Supp. 255 (N.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd, 708 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984) (holding complete
ban on aircraft operations at night invalid) and United States v. County of Westchester, 571
F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding curfew invalid).
The following are among the leading cases holding nonproprietor enacted night access
regulations invalid: Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (city imposed curfew on privately owned airport), discussed supra notes 191-202 and accompanying
text; Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1983) (municipality that owned
but leased out airport could not subsequently limit night operations), discussed supra notes
212-16 and accompanying text; San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th
Cir. 1981) (state sought to impose more stringent curfew than that developed by the proprietor, itself a political subdivision of the state), discussed supra notes 203-11 and accompanying
text.
332. TOWN OF ISLIP CODE § 3B-1 (1984). Specific situations within which the ordinance
may be waived include: "extreme weather or operational conditions, which may cause flight
arrival delays beyond the control of the airlines .... Id. (emphasis added). While the statute
shows the town's recognition of the airport's role in the national system, the statute and other
town access regulations undercut the efficient operation of that system. See Morse, supra note
309, at 2.
333. TOWN OF ISLIP CODE § 3B-1 (1984). The ordinance provides:
The Town Board of the Town of Islip hereby declares its intent to promote an environment free from unreasonably loud, disturbing and unnecessary noises since they
are deemed to be detrimental to the life, health, welfare, safety and good order of
the people of the Township of Islip. By its enactment, the Town Board intends to
promote the health, safety, morale and general welfare of the people of the Town of
Islip by seeking to reduce noise levels for nighttime operations of aircraft to and
from MacArthur Airport, and, in the exercise of its police powers in this regard,
the Town Board of the Town of Islip does hereby enact the following ordinance.
Id. (emphasis added). In addition to the explicit invocation of the police power, the promotion
of the "health, safety, morale and general welfare" are considered classic justifications for the
exercise of police power. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
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Contrary to case law and legislation which preempts the exercise of
police power to regulate aircraft noise, the ordinance expressly states
that it is enacted by the town "in the exercise of its police pow334

ers."

A second regulation at MacArthur is the Noise Allocation Plan,
which sets a cap on the daily cumulative noise level around the airport, but does not directly cap the number of flights or limit access.33 As such, it would appear to be a judicially sustainable regulation particularly given prior Second Circuit decisions.336 According
to the plan, airlines are randomly awarded noise allocations or budg(1926);

BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979) (defining police power).
334. TowN OF ISLIP CODE § 3B-1 (1984). The quoted language in the text may render
the ordinance facially defective. However, given that the town of Islip is also the proprietor of
MacArthur Airport, the language may not be that critical if one looks through form to substance. See Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 381-89 (discussing the necessity of proprietors' use of the police power to give their regulations effect beyond simple contract remedies against airport users); letter from Lawrence Donahue, Deputy Town Attorney, Town of
Islip (Dec. 15, 1987) (on file at Hofstra Law Review) (arguing exercise of police power is
connected to powers arising out of proprietary exception).
335. TOWN OF ISLIP CODE ch. 3D (1986). See Long Island MacArthur Airport data
base, supra note 310 (setting forth the Long Island MacArthur Airport Interim Environmental Management Plan, which implements the Noise Allocation Plan of Chapter 3D). This
ordinance was developed by the town in cooperation with the FAA. Rosche interviews supra
note 310; Bartolomei interview, supra note 308; Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition To
Motion For Preliminary Injunction at 1-3, New York Airlines v. Town of Islip, 85 Civ. 851723 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Knack & Schwab, supra note 21, at 15 (discussing a similar
regulation at John Wayne Airport). Cf Bohemia Civic Association interview supra note 319
(statement of Ms. Ekstam):
A noise limit does not necesssarily imply an access limit i.e. the number of flights
using the airport. However, it can imply an access limit in regard to the type of
aircraft using the airport. As in the case of MacArthur, the noise limit in no way
limited the number of flights.
Id.
336. See Global Int'l Airways Corp. v. Port Auth., 727 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding interim proprietor regulation requiring airlines to use a set percentage of quieter aircraft to limit cumulative noise exposure); Arrow Air, Inc. v. Port Auth., 602 F. Supp. 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing as reasonable a proprietor ban of noisier aircraft despite a federal
exemption from Part 36 requirements); supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing
1972 proposal by Senator Muskie calling for the establishment of "cumulative noise exposure
levels" at and around airports). These regulations evidence political and judicial recognition of
the reasonableness and probable lawfulness of the town of Islip's Noise Allocation Plan, especially on an interim basis. But see Western Air Lines v. Port Auth., 817 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.
1987) (allowing multiple airport proprietor to limit access to one airport); City of Houston v.
FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1194 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing case where single airport proprietor sought
to impose perimeter rule prohibiting flights from beyond a certain distance, a regulation which
does not necessarily limit overall access but was still invalidated). Though distinguishable, the
MacArthur noise budget could conceivably prohibit access once the cumulative noise level is
reached. In such an instance the regulation might be invalidated as an access prohibition enacted by a single airport proprietor.
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ets until the cumulative noise level for all aircraft operations is
reached. 3 Airlines may then schedule as many flights as their total
noise allocation allows. 33 8 Thus, the more noise-efficient the aircraft
used at MacArthur are, the more flights an airline can schedule.339
Although also drafted in police power language, 340 the ordinance ex-

plicitly states the need to regulate access "on a fair, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory basis,"341 thus tracking the language of earlier
regulations and cases.342
These two ordinances have had a significant effect. Noise has
been reduced at the most sensitive nighttime and morning hours as
has the overall noise impact.3 43 This is primarily due to the marked
increase in the number of Stage 3 operations at MacArthur.
Whereas only twenty-three percent of air carrier operations involved
quieter Stage 3 aircraft prior to adoption of the Noise Allocation
337. TOWN OF ISLIP CODE ch. 3D (1986).
338. Id.
339. Id.; Rosche interviews, supra note 310.
340. TOWN OF ISLIP CODE ch. 3D (1986). The ordinance seeks to "promote and protect
the health, safety and welfare of the public." Id. at § 3D-1. For a brief discussion of such
language, see supra note 333. As the deputy town attorney has stated:
Any regulation enacted by the proprietor must be reasonably related to the health,
safety and welfare of the Town's residents. Thus, to us, it is entirely appropriate to
refer in the Noise Allocation Plan Ordinance to health, safety and welfare. If our
position is correct, then the failure to relate the regulation to such factors would
render it facially defective.
Letter from Lawrence Donahue, Deputy Town Attorney, Town of Islip (Dec. 15, 1987) (on
file at Hofstra Law Review); see also Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 381-89 (discussing police power).
341. TOWN OF ISLIP CODE § 3D-i (1986). The ordinance states:
The Town Board of the Town of Islip hereby declares its intent to promote and
protect the health, safety and welfare of the public from excessive noise generated
by commercial jet aircraft operating at Long Island MacArthur Airport. By its enactment, the Town Board recognizes the overdemand for and overutilization of existing airport facilities; the resulting detriment to the life, health, welfare, safety and
good order of the people of the Township of Islip; the necessity of conforming the
access demands of the commercial air carriers; and the necessity and desire to
achieve such a balance between environmental protection and access demands on a
fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis to all commercial air carriers requesting use of the facilities.
Id. (emphasis added).
342. See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating airport proprietor may "promulgate reasonable, nonarbitrary and non-discriminatory regulations that establish acceptable noise levels for the airport and its immediate environs").
343. Most commentators agree with this evaluation. Rosche interviews, supra note 310;
Bohemia Civic Association interview, supra note 319; Koppelman interview, supra note 309.
In addition, the airport has continued to grow. Long Island MacArthur data base, supra note
310.
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Plan, at present fifty-two percent of operations are of Stage 3 aircraft. 3, 4 Other reasons for the noise reduction include the federally
mandated termination of Stage 1 operations3 45 and the demise of the
deregulation era new entrant airline that reinvigorated MacArthur
while operating noisy Stage 1 aircraft and consistently violating the
previous curfew. 3" 6
Despite the effectiveness of these regulations, they are only interim in nature pending completion of the town's Part 150 study and
FAA approval of the related Part 150 plan. 47 Legally, it would appear that the regulations are sustainable, to a point, as long as they
remain interim in nature.3" Beyond that, the legal status of the regulations is an open issue. 4 9
While these two regulations have yet to be challenged in court,
related town of Islip actions at MacArthur Airport have been litigated. For instance, in New York Airlines v. Town of Islip,35 0 an
airline challenged a temporary moratorium on new jet flights at
MacArthur. 351 The moratorium was imposed following the enactment of two earlier access regulation plans sharply criticised by the
FAA.3 521 The suit was brought while the town of Islip was developing
the Noise Allocation Plan. 53 The district court upheld the morato344.

Rosche interviews, supra note 310. But see FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra

note 33, at 6, Table 1 (reporting that in 1985 Stage 3 aircraft made up 20.4% of the United
States fleet).

345. Bartolomei interview, supra note 308; see also notes 120-30 and accompanying text
(discussing Part 36 and the end of Stage 1 operations).

346. Bartolomei interview, supra note 308.
347.

Rosche interviews, supra note 310; Bartolomei interview, supra note 308; Defend-

ants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 10, New York
Airlines v. Town of Islip, 85 Civ. 85-1723 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating "It is understood by both

Islip and the FAA that the noise plan being currently developed is only interim in nature
pending completion of the detailed Part 150 noise study and the updated master plan."); see
also notes 162-72 and accompanying text (discussing Part 150 program).
348. See e.g., New York Airlines v. Town of Islip, 85 Civ. 85-1723 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(upholding interim flight moratorium at MacArthur). The case is discussed more fully infra
notes 350-54 and accompanying text. But see British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564 F.2d

1004 (2d Cir. 1977) (positing reasonableness test of proprietor regulations and noting that
delay in studying and acting in such a manner may render a regulation unreasonable).
349. See supra notes 331, 336 and accompanying text (analyzing the regulations in light
of some prior cases).
350.

85 Civ. 85-1723 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 1985) (denying request for a preliminary

injuction).
351. Id. at 2.
352. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
7-9, New York Airlines v. Town of Islip, 85 Civ. 85-1723 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting FAA

criticism of plans based on terminal and landside capacity constraints).
353.

Id.
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rium as "a reasonable and nondiscriminatory interim measure.' "
In Town of Islip v. Eastern Air Lines, 55 an oral agreement between the town and an air carrier serving MacArthur was found by
the district court to be a valid means of limiting the carrier's
flights.3 56 The agreement, outside of the prior Noise Allocation
Plan, 57 was entered into when the highest volume carrier at the airport filed for bankruptcy and relinquished its slots.358 Despite contrary theories on the extent of the agreement, 59 the district court
granted the town a permanent injunction based on the town's argument that the agreement was meant to preserve MacArthur's noisebased flight cap.3 60 While the Second Circuit vacated the district
court's contempt order against the airline for noncompliance with
what it found to be an ambiguous order, the court affirmed the permanent injunction.""
Drawing upon the experience of MacArthur Airport, some conclusions regarding access regulations are readily apparent. For one,
they are an effective means of controlling noise. 3 2 Moreover, the 3ef63
fectiveness of these regulations makes them politically attractive.

While regulations like the Noise Allocation Plan seem promising in
that they do not directly restrict access, any local regulation still im354. Id. See Midway Airlines v. County of Westchester, 584 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (upholding airport's deferral of review of air carrier application for access while completing study on "rational and nondiscriminatory rules" needed to allocate access in a way that
would serve local environmental and safety concerns). For other similar interim airport
moratoriums or rules, see Global Int'l Airways Corp. v. Port Auth., 727 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.
1984); supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text; British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 558
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977); supra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
355. 793 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1986). The agreement required the air carrier to relinquish its
flight slots upon the renewal of flight operations by the bankrupt air carrier that had previously
held the slots. Id.
356. Id. at 80 (discussing the district court's issuance of oral and later unpublished written permanent injunction against air carrier).
357. Id. The prior plan was called the "Interim Environmental Management Plan." Id.
at 82.
358. Id. at 80.
359. Id. at 80-85.
360. Id. at 85 (noting affirmance of district court's permanent injunction and vacation of
contempt order).
361. Id. The result required the air carrier to request the slots through the noise allocation lottery process.
362. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text; Blackman & Freeman, supra note
19, at 376.
363. See Bartolomei interview, supra note 308; Koppelman interview, supra note 309
(noting that community leaders opposing town airport policies later sought town office); see
also Ellett, supra note 13, at 2-5.
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pacts the system, some more than others. a 4 Still, such regulations
are perhaps more equitable as they force aircraft operators to internalize the externalities of aircraft noise."a 5 Finally, the case of Long
Island MacArthur Airport underscores the uncertain bounds of authority with regard to airport access issues.3 66
VI. PROPOSALS REGARDING THE AIRPORT
ACCESS PROBLEM:

1982-87

The following section analyzes some of the possible approaches
to the airport access problem, as proposed by various groups between
1982 and 1987. These proposals provide an essential foundation for
understanding the present state of the access controversy and the potentials and problems of future directions in this area of the law.
A. Industry Task Force on Airport Capacity
Improvement and Delay Reduction
The Industry Task Force on Airport Capacity Improvement and
Delay Reduction (Industry Task Force), comprised of representatives from all sectors of the aviation industry, 67 was formed in 1982
and reported its recommendations to the FAA later that same
year. 6 8 With regard to noise, the Industry Task Force noted that
despite past efforts to mitigate its effect, noise was "one of the most
significant factor[s] negatively affecting the growth and development
3 69
of airports and aviation required to satisfy capacity demands. 3
The group's limited recommendations 370 for alleviating noise stressed
both the need for continued enforcement of existing federal regulations, including Part 36,371 Part 91,72 and the key role of planning
364. See, e.g., Ellett, supra note 13, at 29; Ellett, supra note 41, at 19.
365. See Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 399-400.
366. See Rosche interviews, supra note 310 (criticizing lack of consistent federal policy);
Bartolomei interview, supra note 308 (arguing that town's actions at airport were in contravention of prior grant assurances); supra notes 331, 336 and accompanying text (analyzing
legality of town regulations).
367.

INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13.

368. Id. The group consisted of "23 representatives of airports, airlines, airframe manufacturers, pilots, air traffic controllers, aircraft owners, and academia" and was assisted by
FAA personnel. Id. (Letter of transmittal from J. Donald Reilly, Chairman, to Lynn Helms,
FAA Administrator, September 29, 1982).
369. Id. at 18.
370. Id. The report stated, "This Task Force has not been able to develop a complete,
unified noise position or plan of action which can be presented to the FAA." Id.
371. Id.; see also supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text (discussing Part 36).
372. INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 18; see also supra notes 124-25
and accompanying text (discussing Part 91, the Fleet Noise Rule).
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efforts, particularly those under Part 150.111
The Industry Task Force's most notable recommendation called
for federal preemption in the noise area and the concomitant assumption of financial liability for noise.3 74 This proposal was particularly significant in light of the federal government's continued aversion to any action bordering on preemption which might render it
liable for the consequences of aircraft and airport noise a- Given the
existing burden of liability on proprietors and the adverse effects proprietary regulations can have on the airline industry, this recommendation is consistent with both groups' interests. The interests of
noise-impacted communities may be compromised, however, at least
in the short and intermediate terms, by such an enhanced federal
role. That is, the political and other efforts exerted by those concerned with noise at an individual airport may prove unavailing
when directed at the traditionally pro-aviation FAA. Conversely,
federal control might prevent noise-impacted communities from
wielding influence disproportionate to their noise problem. In either
case, while federal control would shift costs and perhaps promote
efficiency in the air transportation system, the proposal set forth by
the Industry Task Force raises serious questions of equity.
B.

Airport Access Task Force

At the time the Industry Task Force was completing its work,
Congress enacted the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of
1982376 which required the Secretary of Transportation to appoint
an Airport Access Task Force.37 7 This group's mandate was to study
and report on "the problems of allocating the use of airport facilities
and airspace ... among persons using or seeking to use such facilities. 3 8 Members appointed included federal and state government
officials,37 9 representatives of different types of air carriers,3 80 finan373. INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 18; see also supra notes 162-72
and accompanying text (discussing Part 150). The Industry Task Force's recommendations

also called for "greater efficiency and cooperation in: (a) integration of municipal and airport
planning... [and] (b) the establishment of efficient zoning laws . . . ." INDUSTRY TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 13, at 18.
374. Id.
375. See AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36-37 (stating mi-

nority comments of the United States Department of Transportation).
376. Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 2223 (1982); see also
supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing Act).
377. 49 U.S.C. § 2223(a) (Appendix 1982).
378. Id.

379. Id. § 2223(b). The Act provided that the Chairman of the CAB chair the Task
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cial institutions with aviation interests, consumer groups, and airport
owners and operators. 381 In 1983, the Airport Access Task Force reported to Congress on three distinct aspects of the access problem:
noise and environmental constraints, terminal space and gates, and
groundside congestion." 2
The Airport Access Task Force's recommendations regarding
noise were similar to, but more specific and far-reaching than those
of the Industry Task Force.38 3 For instance, the Airport Access Task
Force proposed legislation that would provide for FAA review of local noise restrictions and federal liability for noise "to the extent
[the] FAA mandates any change to local rules."38s4 Under this suggested legislation the FAA would review proposed airport regulations to determine: (1) "whether meaningful noise abatement will
result; ' 3 5 and (2) if there is "an undue burden on interstate comForce. It also required that the Departments of Transportation and Justice be represented. Id.
380. Id. The different types of air carriers included were: trunks (major national airlines), regional, charter, commuter and all-cargo air carriers. General aviation interests were
also represented. Id. Such diverse industry representation seemingly served two purposes-one
practical, one political. Because distinct classes of air carriers use different types and sizes of
aircraft and also conduct operations at different times (e.g. all-cargo or air freight carriers
often run the bulk of their operations at night) their interests may not always coincide. See
FAA Hearings,supra note 41, comments of the Air Freight Association, at 4. Rather, they
may sometimes be in conflict. Moreover, widespread industry representation could well serve to
enhance the prospects for reforms to be translated into reality once they make it back to the
political arena.
381. 49 U.S.C. § 2223(b) (Appendix 1982). The Act specifically required that representative airports include those "owners and operators of airports . .

.

.which do not restrict

access, but which provide service to airports where access is currently restricted or is expected
to be restricted in the future." Id. This provision insured a more balanced proprietor perspective on access issues. Combined with the lack of explicit recognition of noise-impacted communities, this requirement may have possibly undercut Task Force consideration of noise as a
legitimate ground for constraining access and the importance of access restrictions in some
cases. The comments of one Task Force member indicated the group may have underestimated
the complexity of the noise problem and the continued need for access regulations. AIRPORT
ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 38 (minority comments of Eric L. Bernthal);
see also Hardaway, supra note 15, at 50-55 (discussing the work of the Task Force).
382. AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 30. The issues involved
with terminal space and gates and groundside congestion are interesting and somewhat relevant to this Note in that some airports allow these factors to constrain access and capacity in
order to mitigate noise. See, e.g., supra note 21 (discussing access in general and airports using
landside access and capacity to constrain growth and limit noise). For the purposes of this
Note, however, analysis of the Task Force focuses on noise and environmental constraints.
383. Compare AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE, REPORT, supra note 20, at 30 with INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 18.
384. AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 30.

385, Id.
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merce."38 More formal FAA involvement would also "assure noise
reduction to the maximum extent practical. 387 This framework
would apparently allow the FAA to weigh the localized benefits of
any regulation against the costs it might impose on the national air
transportation system. Consistent with this framework, the Task
Force also called for a reduction in local regulations and restrictions
on Stage 2 and Stage 3 aircraft.388
In addition to proposing federal liability for noise, the Task
Force urged action which would further the federal government's financial role in alleviating noise. The Task Force recommended new
economic and tax incentives for air carrier fleet modernization 8" and
the conversion of noise-impacted property to compatible or more
noise insulated land uses.390
The Report of the Airport Access Task Force also contained
strongly worded minority comments submitted by the Departments
of Transportation (DOT) and Justice (DOJ). The DOT argued that
the group had failed "to document a problem warranting further
Federal action," ' 1 and that the present allocation of responsibilities
was proper in that the amount of air service and noise a community
wants should be a local decision.392 Additionally, it argued that the
FAA's existing authority to challenge access restrictions and to withdraw grant monies provides an adequate protection against excessive
local regulation. 393 Consequently, the DOT reaffirmed its 1976 policy statement and rejected the recommendation of federal preemption. 94 The DOT and the DOJ criticized the group's call for subsidies for air carrier fleet modernization and strongly encouraged the
use of market mechanisms like noise fees to deal with the problem.3" 5 Such charges could serve to compensate noise-impacted property owners while also encouraging aircraft operators to make noisebased management and investment decisions.39 6
386. Id.
387. Id.
388.

Id.

389.

Id.

390.
391.

Id.
Id. at 37.

392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

36-37.
36.
36-37.
37 (stating minority comments of the DOT); id. at 43-47 (stating minority

comments of the DOJ); see also Nierenberg, Incentives versus Regulation: The Casefor Air-

port Noise Charges, 2 GEo.

MASON

U.L. REv. 167 (1978).

396. AIRPORT AccEss TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 45-46 (stating minority
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C. Airline Industry Proposal
The airline industry and its trade group, the ATA, have grown
increasingly distressed at the federal government's failure to act with
regard to the proliferation of local access regulations. 97 Whereas
noise-impacted communities and airport proprietors believe the federal government's noise control efforts have not gone far enough in
taking responsibility for noise, and have gone too far in restricting
their power, 398 the airlines believe the federal government has been
too tolerant of local access restrictions. 391 Consequently, in 1984 the
ATA petitioned the FAA for rulemaking to address the access
problem.40 0
The first part of the ATA's proposal calls for the FAA to adopt
more precise policy quidelines with regard to access regulations and
for the FAA to alert airport proprietors that it will take aggressive
action with regard to access restrictions. 1 Of particular concern to
the ATA are access restrictions that impair safety, efficiency, or
commerce, or those which are unjust, arbitrary, or which impose
burdens on airport users disproportionate to the anticipated
benefits.40 2

The second part of the ATA proposal would seek to promote
greater uniformity among local access regulations. 3 To this end,
airport proprietors would be required to submit a kind of regulatory
impact statement and analysis of new regulations to the FAA for
comments of the DOJ).
397. FAA Hearings,supra note 41, comments of the ATA; ATA Proposal, supra note
21, at 43,020. Recently sixteen ATA member airlines formed a new lobbying group to lead
their efforts to increase airport capacity. Dissatisfaction with ATA efforts in the area and
recognition of the need to establish a broader base of support on capacity issues was the impetus behind the creation of this organization. Ott, Airline Lobby to Take Reins From ATA on
Capacity Issues, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 7, 1988, at 60-61.
398. See FAA Hearings, supra note 41, comments of the Airport Operators Council
International, at 8; FAA Hearings,supra note 41, comments of the city of Long Beach, at 12.
The concerns of these communities and airport proprietors were also embodied in a 1984 petition for rulemaking to phaseout Stage 2 operations. 49 Fed. Reg. 13,375 (1984) (Petition for
Rulemaking of the National Organization to Insure a Sound-Controlled Enviroment (NOISE)
& AOCI). The NOISE/AOCI proposal noted that in considering the aircraft-noise problem:
"More important than accoustical expressions such as Ldn or sheer acreage is the personal
human impact of the individual noise event." Id. at 13,377.
399. ATA Proposal, supra note 21.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 43,022.
402. Id. at 43,020-21.
403. Id. at 43,023.
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review based on its new policy initiatives. 40° The FAA would then
assert its expert opinion as to whether the regulation was consistent
with federal aviation and constitutional law. °5 If found inconsistent
with the law, the FAA would institute appropriate action against the
proprietor.4 6 According to the ATA, the FAA's findings would
eventually serve as guidelines for proprietors to use in shaping their
regulations. 7
The FAA would neither approve nor disapprove the regulations
it reviewed.40 8 This provision is similar to the present informal advisement process used by the FAA. 9 In contrast to the Industry
and Airport Access Task Force's proposals, this provision would continue to insulate the federal government from liability for noise
damages. 0
The proposal also perpetuates some of the problems it seeks to
address. First, the formal FAA review process would add another
layer of delay in the access conflict controversy. Second, if a dissatisfied party were involved, the validity of the regulation would ultimately be litigated. The courts have the same statutory and common
law to guide them as the FAA, but there is no guarantee that they
would develop any more uniform standards.
D. FAA Proposal
The FAA acknowledged the ATA proposal in a 1986 notice of
proposed policy for airport access and capacity. 1 1 The notice stated
the FAA's concern with maintaining sufficient airport capacity41 2
404.

Id.

405. Id.
406. Id. Such action might consist of a review of the airport proprietor's agreements
with the FAA, including the airport's certification, or perhaps initiating litigation. See, e.g.,
San Francisco v. Engen, 819 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1987).
407. ATA Proposal, supra note 21, at 43,023.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 43,023-24.
410. Id. at 43,024. Airport and community interests have argued, however, that any
kind of review delaying implementation of a noise-related program may amount to a partial
preemption and hence federal liability for noise during the period of delay. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 367-68 (remarks of Martin J. Butler, Mayor of Park Ridge, Illinois,
Chairman of Suburban O'Hare Commission).
411. FAA Proposal, supra note 21, at 2986.
412. Id. at 2986. Sufficient capacity is to be attained "in a safe, efficient and environmentally sound manner." Id. The other major objectives posited by the FAA were to clearly
delineate FAA and proprietor roles and to reduce federal intervention in access cases on an ad
hoc basis. Id.
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and delineated FAA policy principles in four related areas. 13 First,
the FAA noted that the goal of increasing airport capacity was second only to safety, and that federal monies and contract terms would
be used to attain this goal, particularly to insure airports operate at
capacity levels commensurate with that federal funds were intended
to establish.41 ' Second, runway and taxiway use, the FAA's role in
promoting safety and efficiency, and the prohibition of arbitrary airport regulations were outlined.415 In addition, imposition of noise restrictions should be preceded by an application of Part 150 guidelines as well as consultation with the FAA.416 Third, the FAA
acknowledged a proprietor responsibility for terminal and landside
facility use when consistent with airside capacity. 417 Finally, the proposal noted that the FAA and airport proprietors shared responsibilities for environmental impact management. 18
The FAA proposal has generated a myriad of reactions. While
then FAA Administrator Engen asserted that the proposal was
merely a reaffirmation of existing federal policy, other interests disagreed vehemently.41 9 For instance, the AOCI, airport proprietors,
state and local governments, and citizen groups argued that the proposal was an unwanted intrusion into local airport policy, amounting
to preemption and was likely to exacerbate the problem by making
airport proprietors and opponents more wary of improvement
projects.420 Alternatively, these groups called for an end to Stage 2
operations and, in some cases, the development of aircraft noise
abatement technology beyond that of existing Stage 3 aircraft. 21
413. Id. at 2987-88.
414. Id. at 2987. That is, at the capacity level consistent with that which should be
maintained given previous federal aid to a specific airport. The coercive use of grant monies
has been litigated in San Francisco v. Engen, 819 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1987), discussed supra
notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
415. FAA Proposal, supra note 21, at 2987.
416. Id. at 2988.
417. Id.; see also Note, Airport Regulation, supra note 21, at 332-37.
418. FAA Proposal, supra note 21, at 2987-88.
419. House Hearings, supra note 18, at 23-24 (testimony of Administrator Engen) (that
the proposal "does not represent a major change in the approach we have been following in
cases when airport access has become an issue, but rather is a clarification or, if you will, a
reaffirmation of our current approach.").
420. See id. at 50-56 (testimony of J. Donald Reilly, Executive Director, AOCI); id. at
190-204 (statement of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey); id. 314-23 (testimony of the city of Long Beach); id. at 59-61 (testimony of Thomas N. Duffy, Executive
Director, NOISE).
421. See id. at 56 (testimony of J. Donald Reilly, Executive Director, AOCI); id. at 6061 (testimony of Thomas N. Duffy, Executive Director, NOISE).
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Conversely, airline, air cargo and other aviation interests have uniformly supported the FAA proposal and asserted that the proposal
is, for the most part, consistent with federal law, although full preemption may also be desirable.422
In short, the FAA proposal, as with any such proposal seeking
to clarify federal policy in this area, is incapable of gaining widespread acceptance without incorporation of other offsetting measures
including a Stage 2 phase-out and perhaps even complete preemption. Without addressing these underlying political realities, this proposal takes an approach to the problem that imposes a perhaps ineq423
uitable distribution of the costs.
E. Working Group on Aircraft Noise/Airport Capacity

An additional blueprint for addressing the aircraft noise problem, as it relates to airport access and capacity, was recently
presented by the Working Group on Aircraft Noise/Airport Capacity. 424 Composed of equal numbers of airline and airport representatives,425 the Working Group's recommendations reflect significant
and potentially far-reaching compromises on the part of both
sides.4 28 These recommendations address aircraft noise abatement
technology, land use measures around airports, noise and access re422. Id. at 551-65 (statement of Gabriel Phillips, Executive Vice President, Administration & Industry Programs, ATA); id. at 566-74 (testimony of Alan R. Stephan, Executive
Vice President, Regional Airline Association); id. at 522-30 (statement of Frederick W.
Smith, Chairman, Federal Express Corp.).
423. See infra notes 441-52 and accompanying text (discussing the equities and political
realities of a subsequent proposal).
424.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15. The Working Group is a more special-

ized offshoot of the Industry Task Force, discussed supra notes 367-75 and accompanying text.
See also telephone interview with Siegbert Poritzky, Vice President, Technical Affairs, Airport
Operators Council International (Jan. 21, 1988) (noting continuing efforts of the Working
Group) [hereinafter Poritzky interview]; J. Murphy interview, supra note 1 (discussing background of the Working Group and its concerns); Stage 2 Cutoff Dates Recommended by U.S.
Task Force, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 28, 1987, at 37; Preble, Industry Group
Urges Stage 2 Phase-Out, Halt to Noise Limits, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 13,
1987, at 30-31; Industry Task Force Recommends Grounding Older Aircraft, AVIATION
DAILY, July 7, 1987, at 25-26 (all three articles discuss the Working Group's background and
proposals).
425. The Working Group is comprised of eight members from each "side." Air freight,
regional and national air carriers, as well as the ATA, are represented within the industry
portion of the Working Group. Airport interests represented include single and multiple airport proprietors and the Airport Operators Council International, the ATA's counterpart on
the airport side. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at Appendix 1.
426. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 9-22.
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strictions, funding sources and public awareness.""
Drawing upon the FAA's 1986 report to Congress on fleet modernization 28 the Working Group's proposal calls for ending production, and limiting future importation and registration of Stage 2 aircraft.4 29 This would be accompanied by the phase-out of all Stage 2
operations by the end of 2009.430 Under the group's proposal, FAA
submission of the Stage 2 phase-out plan to Congress would trigger
a one year moratorium on new airport access restrictions based on
the time of day and the type or number of aircraft.43 ' If enacted, the
group's plan would contain legislation extending the moratorium by
preempting airports from imposing access regulations and transferring related noise liability to the federal government.432
Legislative modifications to the Part 150 program are also proposed. Recommendations in this area include: fine-tuning the FAA's
integrated noise model, 433 revising Part 150 to account for the characteristics of different airports and the diversity of development surrounding them,434 and mandating state legislation to require written
notice of the airport be given to any potential property buyers within
a two mile radius of the airport. 5 Greater state involvement with
427. Id.
428. FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION; supra note 33.
429. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 9-12.
430, Id. at 10. The proposal provides for five three-year periods, commencing at the end
of 1994, within each of which an air carrier must retire 20% of its Stage 2 fleet. Credits would
be available to carriers retiring additional Stage 2 aircraft before a particular deadline. In
addition, air cargo carriers and new entrant airlines could request limited exceptions from the
FAA. Id. at 10-11.
431. Id. at 18. The proposal allows proprietors to continue to regulate non-access matters like aircraft operational procedures, landside management of airport facilities and various
land use measures. Id. at 19. Congressional failure to enact the group's plan within one year of
submission would terminate the moratorium. Id. at 18.
432. Id. at 18. This portion of the Working Group's plan mirrors earlier proposals advocating federal preemption in this area. See AIRPORT AccESS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
20; supra notes 383-88, 391-96 and accompanying text; INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 13; supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text. But see ATA Proposal, supra note
21; supra notes 403-10 and accompanying text (eschewing federal preemption).
433. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 22.
434. Id. at 14. The proposal indicates that an airport's classification would determine
the appropriate noise control actions at a particular airport. Id. Given the existing Part 150
airport specific consultation and planning process, see supra notes 162-72 and accompanying
text, this particular recommendation does not appear very different or innovative. This proposal may, however, minimize or eliminate the input citizens presently have in the Part 150
planning process.
435. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 16. "Real estate brokers, title insurers, mortgagees and/or lenders" would be required to provide such notice. Like a comparable
provision under Part 150, notice is intended to serve as a bar to recovery in a suit for noise
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off-site property would be strongly encouraged through the creation
of Airport Environmental Protection Areas (AEPAs) around public
airports.436 In addition, local Environmental Management Boards
(EMBs) would be vested with authority for promoting compatible
land uses and developing off-site noise mitigation plans. 37
The Working Group proposal also included recommendations to
use the aviation trust fund to pay for airport projects addressing
noise and capacity problems. 38 Furthermore, the proposal recommended that additional economic incentives be developed to encourage air carriers to accelerate fleet modernization. 439 Finally, a
program to promote greater public awareness of the benefits of air
transportation was urged.440
A number of additional observations regarding the Working
Group's recommendations ought to be noted. That the proposal represents a set of meaningful compromises is most noteworthy 441 and
may make the package a workable one. Ironically, this also makes
the possible enactment of the recommendations problematic at best.
For instance, the Stage 2 phase-out would impose substantial costs
on air carriers and denies them some flexibility in making business
judgments. At the same time, the phase-out provides air carriers
with a certain planning horizon in which to make investment decisions. 442 Interestingly, the time frame of the phase-out does not differ
related damages. Id.
436. Id. at 15.
437. Id. EMB authority would be limited to non-airport property within the 65 Ldn line.
Id.
438. Id. at 21-22. Trust fund backed loans would be made available to address these
concerns.
439. Id. at 21-22; see also FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 33 (describing
different economic incentives, advantages and disadvantages of each).

440.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note

15, at 20.

441. See id., at 2, stating:
Central to the program recommendations is a needed commitment by the entire
aviation industry to the serious compromises that must be made in a spirit of shared
responsibility with the Federal Government and the general public. It is only
through a full acceptance of this public and private responsibility for shared solutions, including a sharing of the benefits and drawbacks of the solutions, that we will
achieve the broad economic and social gains offered by the civil aviation system for
our nation and, particularly, for the general public in the individual communities
served by our nation's system of public airports.
Id.
442. See Preble, Inaction on Noise Standards Raises Industry Concern Over Stage 2
TECH., Jul. 6, 1987, at 38 (quoting industry consultant discussing valuation and amortization problems due to uncertainty over the future life of Stage 2
aircraft).

Fleet, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
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significantly from the projected rate of fleet modernization without a
mandated phase-out of Stage 2 aircraft.4 4 3
Additionally, the proposal would strip airport proprietors and
local governments of the power to regulate access and land use respectively, without necessarily reducing noise beyond what the market might accomplish. 44 Of course, the shift of financial liability to
the federal government would lessen the fiscal burden on. local policy
makers, but political pressures on them may remain undiminished.44 5
That is, without significant noise reduction, local policy makers may
still encounter considerable political pressure while having even less
power to respond to it than they do at present. One alternative to the
Working Group proposal could involve preserving the proprietors'
rights while also shifting airport management from government to
public or private airport authorities. 446 The effect would be to somewhat de-politicize airport policy, keep financial liability on the airport and its users, and maintain greater local accessibility to decision-makers.
The Working Group's recommendation of federal preemption
also provides the federal government with a difficult, if not impossible choice. At the least, legislation to that effect would signal a
marked shift in federal policy that has strenously avoided preemption of airport proprietors.4 47 Even with the advent of a new political
443. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 10 (proposing phase-out of all
Stage 2 low-bypass operations by Dec. 31, 2009). But see FAA, FLEEr MODERNIZATION,
supra note 33, at 6, Table 1 (forecasting that Stage 2 aircraft will make up only 11.3 percent
of the total U.S. fleet by 2005 based on current trends without any governmental intervention).
See also Airport Operators Council International, Res. No. 19 (1987) (U.S. Members Only)
(On the Industry Task Force Report on Airport Noise/Capacity) [hereinafter AOCI, Res. No.
19] (noting reservations about WORKING GROUP REPORT including imbalance of what proprietors would forego in exchange for modest acceleration of fleet modernization).
444. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 10; see also AOCI, Res. No. 19,
supra note 443 (identifying concern about effects on state and local governments and suggesting earlier phase-out of Stage 2 aircraft with the aid of federal economic incentives).
445. See Rosche interviews, supra note 310 (expressing concern over "home rule"); E.
Murphy interview, supra note 317 (voicing reservations over fragmentation of the planning
function through the creation of the EMBs, especially in areas where the airport proprietor
already has the power to regulate land uses); AOCI, Res. No. 19, supra note 443 (stating
similar reservations).
446. Bartolomei interview, supra note 308 (suggesting this possibility in lieu of federal
preemption).
447. See AIRPORT AccEss TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36-37, 43-47 (minority comments of Departments of Transportation and Justice reaffirming federal policy of rejecting the idea of preemption); DOT NoISE POLICY, supra note 149, at 34 (rejecting
preemption).
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administration,4 48 other national priorities and fiscal constraints
would seem formidable obstacles to federal preemption. 4
In closing, with regard to the Working Group, it is critically
important not to underestimate the group's efforts and its mission.
For one, the group's efforts continued into 1988450 and these and
other related efforts are sure to continue until the airport access

problem is resolved. Without a final new FAA policy released as
yet,451 the group's final recommendations may indeed play a large
role in the forthcoming policy. Moreover, if there is one point on
which nearly all of those involved with the aircraft noise/airport access problem can agree, it is the need for a massive cooperative effort
to meet the challenges these issues present.45 2
VII.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE AIRPORT

AccEss

PROBLEM

The aforementioned approaches are but some of the avenues
open to address the access problem. What follows are some modest
proposals that seek to use the best and most workable of what has,
448.

Preemption would clearly be inconsistent with Reagan administration policies. See

AIRPORT AccEss TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36-37 (minority comments of the

Department of Transportation). Moreover, the President's Commission On Privatization recently issued recommendations that would seek to reduce the federal role in the air traffic
system by: encouraging airports to increase the amount of funding received from airport users,
including passengers; advocating peak hour fees to minimize congestion; and urging federal
airport monies be generated from higher user fees. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 65-89 (1988). The Commission did, however, note that the revenue from these fees could be used to support noise abatement programs. Id. at 75. Furthermore, the costs of noise liability borne out of preemption
would undercut these proposals or perhaps require huge increases in user fees. See supra, notes
37, 69 (discussing costs of noise liability). Conversely, the proliferation of access regulations
may undermine some of the post-deregulation benefits supported by the administration.
449. See, e.g., supra note 448.
450. Poritzky interview, supra note 424.
451. The latest projected date for such a pronouncement from the FAA is April 1988.
Av. L. REP., Nov. 9, 1987, at 4-5; Proctor, supra note 26, at 108 (noting that this proposal
"will make use of-but not necessarily incorporate-recommendations [of the Working
Group]").
452. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 2; see also Scott, Conferees Urge
Establishment of National Airspace, Airport Development Program,AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Dec. 14, 1987, at 41 (reporting on Air Traffic Control Association's annual conference,
noting that all parties must cooperate, suggesting need for politically independent FAA and
public education and addressing environmental concerns so as to expand and build more airports); Mordoff, Forum Urges Iniationof Joint Efforts To Expand Airport, Airway Capacity,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 12, 1987, at 49 (emphasizing great need for cooperative
effort to overcome noise problem in order to meet future airport capacity demands).
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and has not, been set forth earlier.453
To begin with, Congress must articulate an integrated aircraft
noise/airport access and capacity policy that anticipates the needs of
the twenty-first century. This policy must give explicit recognition to
the need for the utmost cooperation from all those involved. As two
commentators recently wrote, "[tihe solution to the [airport access
and] capacity problem, however, will not come on the back of any
one element of the system.' 4
Tracking earlier legislative efforts, the first area of Congressional concern should be aircraft noise abatement technology. Future
addition of Stage 2 aircraft into the domestic fleet should be prohibited.45 5 Furthermore, a Stage 2 operations termination date should
be established immediately. This would allow aircraft users and
manufacturers greater leeway in planning future purchases. The latest possible date considered should be earlier than the Working
Group's recommendation of 2009 and closer to its projected target of
2000 with the help of financial incentives. 456 Financial incentives
such as those suggested by the Working Group, 45 7 including loans
and grants from the Aviation Trust Fund, should be provided to relieve some of the financial burden imposed on aircraft operators.45 8
In addition, development of Stage 4 technology should be fostered,
perhaps through the use of research grants.459
453. Given the attempted breadth of this Note, the following ideas are set out for discussion without the more detailed analysis that is, in some cases, warranted.
454. Blackman & Freeman, supra note 19, at 398 n.68. Congressional intervention is
needed because FAA action in the absence of Congressional direction and support is likely to
be more controversial and perhaps subject to additional litigation. Ironically, without widespread agreement on a particular course of action, Congress itself may be less likely to act. As
a recent editorial noted, "no national noise policy is going to be popular." The Noise Issue,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 21, 1988, at 9. The editorial goes on to exhort the
aviation industry to "start framing an effective noise policy immediately, to avoid having an
unsuitable one shoved down its throat." Id.
455. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 10; FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 33, at 22; see also Proctor, supra note 26, at 108 (reporting that airline
industry concedes that such action is imminent).
456.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 9-12.

457. Id. at 21-22.
458.

See FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 33, at 14-20 (discussing investment

tax credits, accelerated depreciation, loan guarantees, and federal funding of stage 2 retrofit
development).
459. Although the federal government does not forsee any significant breakthroughs in
aircraft noise abatement technology within the next two decades, FAA, FLEET MODERNiZATION, supra note 33, at 13, efforts to overcome this challenge should be encouraged. See
House Hearings, supra note 18, at 56 (testimony of J. Donald Reilly, Executive Director,
AOCI) (calling for additional efforts towards the development of Stage 4 aircraft); Rocken-
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On the local level, aircraft operators and airport proprietors
should seek means of factoring noise considerations into their decision-making with direct limitations on access employed only as a last
resort. Here, the noise budget regulations employed at a handful of
airports hold promise since they encourage the use of quieter aircraft
without strictly limiting access." 60 To the extent that, or in places
where aircraft noise is primarily an economic problem (i.e. it lowers
property values or lack of funding for noise mitigation programs),
economic approaches including noise-based landing fees and time
limited easements should be considered.461 Moreover, all local regulations should be the product of consultation between airport proprietors, airport users, impacted residents and the federal government.
At the federal level, both the FAA and the EPA should be informed
of forthcoming local regulations." 2 Both federal agencies would review the proposal and issue informal opinions as to the safety and
environmental effects of the regulation. These opinions could be published periodically to foster an exchange of information. Complete
authority for implementation remains with the airport proprietors.
This informal consultation and notification process would promote
cooperation and perhaps reduce litigation.463
stein, supra note 32, at 3 (advocating the development of Stage 4 technology); see also Bern-

stein, Sounding Out Electronic Silence, Newsday, Dec. 7, 1987, Pt. III, at 3 (discussing new
technology using reverse soundwaves to cancel noise); NOISE CANCELLATION TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., ELECTRONIC ATTENUATION OF NOISE AND VIBRATION (1987) (explaining noise cancellation and noting present limitations on effectively eliminating the noise generated by jet
engines).

460. See supra notes 335-49 and accompanying text (discussing Noise Allocation Plan
at Long Island MacArthur Airport). See also Knack & Schwab, supra note 21, at 15 (noting

noise budget at John Wayne Airport). Of course, these regulations work at only as many
localities as the airlines can fit desired operations and available Stage 3 aircraft into. Addition-

ally, any local regulation, while equitable to the interests of those impacted around that airport, imposes costs on the users of that airport and perhaps evens noise impacted citizens

elsewhere. Recalling the equitable maxim, "equity seeks to do justice and that not in halves,"
underscores the complexity of striving to attain a fair resolution of the problem at hand.
461.

See Bell & Bell, supra note 34, at 645-52 (noise-based landing fees); Nierenberg,

supra note 395 (discussing noise charges); Baxter & Altree, Legal Aspect Of Airport Noise,
15 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1972) (discussing time limited easements); see generally Coase, The Prob-

lem Of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (discussing economic approaches to social
problems).
462. See FAA Proposal, supra note 21; ATA Proposal, supra note 21; supra notes 14148 and accompanying text (regarding possible EPA role).

463. There is no guarantee that this would reduce litigation, but vigorous consultation
and negiotiation can lead to acceptable compromises, especially if all parties factor in the

litigation costs. See supra notes 403-10 and accompanying text (discussing a similar portion of
the ATA Proposal); supra notes 335-49 and accompanying text (detailing the noise allocation
plan at Long Island MacArthur Airport developed by the airport proprietor in conjunction
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, greater rather than
less 464 public participation in airport policies must be encouraged.
Public awareness campaigns like that proposed by the Working
Group,46 5 combined with the participation of responsible citizens
with different perspectives, may prove an effective means of alleviating the problem in the longer term, especially in suburban communities fearful of uncontrolled growth.4 6 Viewing noise as a challenge
instead of a constraint and giving people a meaningful say in airport
policy might make everyone more responsive to other aspects of the
problem so that controlled, socially sound airport development can

be provided where needed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As long as aircraft continue to generate noise within the vicinity
of residential areas, aircraft noise will be a problem.46 7 While the
problem exists, noise-impacted communities will continue to pressure
government entities and airport proprietors to alleviate the noise.
Many actions to reduce noise will amount to regulations and restrictions with regard to airport access. 468 This means that a continued
conflict
may exist between such regulation and federal aviation policy, 469 which clearly seeks to promote air transportation through
maintaining open access and expanding airport capacity.470 More
importantly, airport capacity will remain stagnant, thus exacerbating
delays and perhaps even compromising air safety.47
with the FAA).
464. See Milch, supra note 44, at 104-09 (advocating less citizen participation).
465. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 20.
466. One example is Long Island MacArthur Airport. See Bohemia Civic Ass'n interview, supra note 319. At MacArthur, citizens of a variety of perspectives are represented in
the Part 150 and Master Plan processes. The town of Islip has, however, refused to commit
itself to a permanent airport advisory committee. Id.; see also Knack & Schwab, supra note
21, at 15 (discussing John Wayne Airport). In this light, the problem shades into the political
sphere where the task becomes attaining a balance between majority rule and minority rights.
On one side are the many, directly or indirectly affected by air transportation, on the other are
those are lesser in number confronted with a threat to their quality of life. See Sexton, Living
With Airport Noise In Islip Is No Tea Party, Newsday, Apr. 22, 1984, Ideas at 8.
467. See Comment, supra note 47, at 526.
468. See FAA, AIRPORT NOISE CONTROL STRATEGIES, supra note 38.
469. This, of course, depends on the outcome of the FAA's present policy-making efforts, discussed supra notes 411-23 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
471. See How Can We Get More Airport Capacity?, Newsday, May 14, 1987, at 94
(editorial explaining the dire need for additional airport capacity and warning of the possibility
of "unacceptably long, costly and dangerous flight delays," and quoting FAA administrator
Engen, who stated that inadequate airport capacity is "the single greatest challenge facing the
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Without a congressional mandate for strong FAA action against
local regulations, or other action alleviating the need for local regulations, future federal policy will continue to concentrate on technological means of noise abatement, 7 2 on modifying aircraft operational methods at individual airports, 4 s and on planning methods
designed to minimize the impact of noise. Consequently, the aircraft noise and airport access problem will persist.
There is, however, reason for optimism. For instance, the continuing introduction of greater numbers of quieter Stage 3 aircraft
will eventually reduce the scope of the noise problem without any
further action. 5 In addition, remedial planning efforts, and long
term planning for airport improvement projects should stabilize and
mitigate future noise impacts. 76 Moreover, adoption of any number
of new policy initiatives, economic incentives, or structural changes,
should reduce the noise over the aircraft noise/airport access controversy. In any event, the problem is serious enough to warrant further
discussion.
James F. Gesualdi

nation's aviation system."); INDUSTRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13; see also supra
notes 56-69 and accompanying text (discussing capacity, delays, safety and economic
concerns).

472.

Ott, supra note 2; see also 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1987).

473.

See Rockenstein, supra note 32.

474.

Ott, supra note 2; see also 14 C.F.R. § 150 (1987).

475.

FAA, FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 33, at 10-12 (estimating that the intro-

duction of more Stage 3 aircraft will reduce the land area within the 65 Ldn contours by 32%
by the year 2000 and 48% by the year 2005).
476. See Note, supra note 35; Bartolomei interview, supra note 308; Koppelman interview, supra note 309.
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